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SOURCE OF INFORMATION OR "DOG AND
PONY SHOW"?: JUDICIAL INFORMATION
SEEKING DURING U.S. SUPREME COURT ORAL
ARGUMENT, 1963-1965 & 2004-2009
James C. Phillips* and Edward L. Carter**
I think a lot of lawyers think that oral argument is just a
dog and pony show.
-- Justice Antonin Scalia'
I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars and lawyers have long debated what role, if any,
oral argument plays in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisionmaking process. While some have attempted anecdotally to
determine whether or not Justices use oral argument to
gather information in order to decide a case, few have
attempted to investigate oral argument empirically.
Additionally, no scholar to date has specifically measured the
levels of information-seeking behavior during oral argument
of individual Justices. Finally, there have been few studies
attempting to quantitatively compare oral argument behavior
in different time periods. This study attempts to address
such deficiencies in Supreme Court scholarship.
*M.A. in Mass Communication from Brigham Young University Ph.D.
candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley; contact: jphillil@berkeley.edu. This is the first in a planned series of
articles by the authors investigating oral argument from quantitative and
qualitative research perspectives.
**Assistant professor of communications at Brigham Young University, J.D.
from Brigham Young University, M.S. in Journalism from Northwestern
University, LL.M candidate in Intellectual Property at the University of
Edinburgh School of Law, former law clerk, Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, contact: ed carter@byu.edu. The authors
wish to thank Kevin Stoker, Rory Scanlon, Anne Worsham, Tom Robinson,
Michael Lynch and Matthew Roberts for their helpful comments on the
manuscript in its various stages.
1. Tim Russert (MSNBC television broadcast May 3, 2008).
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Despite the dearth of quantitative investigations of oral
argument, comments from the Justices themselves point to
the fact that oral argument has not always been an important
factor in cases. 2 Additionally, research on judicial behavior
has indicated that factors other than just the legal merits of a
case are often propelling the Court towards the decisions it
reaches. And qualitative studies of oral argument often
reveal a Court functioning much differently than the naive
portrait of Justices asking attorneys questions in order to find
out which party the law supports.
In particular, three broad research questions drive this
study and its analysis. First, which factors influence the
levels of information seeking Justices exhibit during U.S.
Second, do Justices'
Supreme Court oral argument?
information-seeking levels during oral argument foreshadow
how they will vote in a case? Third, is the level of information
seeking significantly different in the 2000s compared to the
By addressing these questions, this study will
1960s?
uniquely contribute to our knowledge of Justice behavior
during oral argument in several ways. The study will be the
first to actually measure judicial information seeking during
oral argument by way of a unique six-point ordinal scale.
This study will also be the only study to apply inferential
statistical analysis of oral arguments at the Justice level.
Additionally, this is the only known study to specifically
analyze oral arguments in cases related to the freedoms of
speech and the press. Finally, this is the first study to single
out judicial behavior during oral arguments in the 1960s and
compare it to behavior in another era.
In order to develop a fuller picture of information seeking
during oral argument, this study will employ a mixed
methods approach, examining oral argument transcripts both
qualitatively and quantitatively. Cases were selected from
both the 1960s (twelve cases) and the 2000s (twenty-three
cases) in order to compare changes in information seeking
2. In a letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to future Justice Felix
Frankfurter after Frankfurter had argued a case before the Supreme Court and
lost, Justice Holmes disclosed that the Court had made up its mind on the case
before even hearing oral arguments and tried to comfort Frankfurter by stating,
"I think you ought to know that the result would not have been different if...
John Marshall and Daniel Webster in combination had argued the case." Kevin
Stoker, The Journalistand the Jurist:PoliticalAdversaries Enlisted in "a Long
Campaign on Behalf of Civil Liberties," 34 JOURNALISM HIST. 216, 222 (2009).
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over time. Cases from the 1970s to the 1990s were not
selected as oral argument transcripts from this time period
did not specify which Justice was speaking, making Justicelevel analysis difficult. All thirty-five cases dealt with the
freedoms of speech and the press in order to ensure that
ideology would be a salient factor in the analysis. Content
analysis was performed on the transcripts with coding being
done at the sentence level.
Obviously the Court holds a prominent place in American
politics and history. Each year the first Monday in October is
greeted with the famous phrase, "Oyez, oyez, oyez," as the
U.S. Supreme Court starts a new term. However, aside from
the announcement of decisions in high profile cases or the
confirmation hearings of nominated Justices, the Court seems
to be largely outside of the consciousness of most Americans.
This is largely due to the disparate media coverage of the
three branches of government. The president, as the face of
the executive branch, has many of his national speeches
televised, and quotable sound bites broadcast on the nightly
news. Meanwhile, Congress seems to be constantly clamoring
for media attention, and a television network, C-SPAN, is
devoted to covering Congress's floor debates and votes.
The Supreme Court, however, performs most of its work
behind closed doors with the Justices, not needing popular
support for reelection due to their lifetime appointments,
staying largely outside public view. And the one aspect of the
Supreme Court's function that is open to the public-the oral
arguments of cases-is not televised. Thus, except for the
hardy souls willing to travel to the capital and wait in line for
a short turn sitting in on an oral argument, Americans are
rather oblivious to this public element of the Court's behavior
and decision-making process. This has made study of the
Court more difficult for scholars, particularly for quantitative
methodologies, as the bulk of data about the behavior of the
Justices arises from qualitative sources, such as anecdotes,
interviews, or personal papers published posthumously.
Furthermore, study of oral argument has lagged behind
other, more accessible aspects of the Court, such as
nomination hearings or opinions. Until recent efforts by
scholars and the Court to post oral argument transcripts on
the Internet, obtaining transcripts required a visit to the
Supreme Court's library or the Library of Congress, and the
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laborious photo copying of each page. Recordings of the
hearings were likewise difficult to obtain. Now, many of the
major cases can be heard online at www.oyez.org, and
transcripts of all cases since 1979 can be obtained on
LexisNexis. This explosion of information is a boon for Court
scholars and has the potential of providing an insightful
glimpse into the minds of the Justices, as well as shedding
needed light on the motivations that drive the Court's
behavior and decisions.
Three major competing models exist to explain judicial
behavior and decision making. The legal model contends that
the legal facts surrounding a case, as well as applicable
statutory and Constitutional law, dictate the decisions of
Justices.' This model seems to infer that Justices are open to
the skill and persuasion of attorneys arguing before them as
some attorneys may be able to frame the legal issues more
cogently than others. The attitudinal model, however, posits
that Justices' ideologies are the main driving force behind
judicial decisions,4 negating attorney-related factors and even
The third model-the
potential inter-Justice influences.
strategic model-holds that Justices act strategically in order
to enact a case outcome as close as possible to their personal
policy preferences. 5 This model seems to indicate that
ideology will lead a Justice to treat the sides in a case
differently.
Prior to 2004, except for a brief period in the early 1960s,
scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court could only test these
models based either on a Justice's votes on the merits, or on
archival material such as released papers from judicial
conferences, because court transcripts failed to delineate
which Justice was speaking during oral argument. However,
starting with the 2004 term, oral argument transcripts began
listing which Justice was speaking. This allows behavior
during oral argument to provide evidence for or against the
various judicial behavior models. This study is one of the
first attempts to analyze oral argument behavior of the
3. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ArrITuDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48 (2002).
4. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme

Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 812 (1995).
5. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
Walter Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565 (1966).
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Justices in light of the legal, attitudinal, and strategic
models.
This study will first provide an overview of relevant
literature regarding current theoretical models of judicial
behavior, followed by a summary of what Justices themselves
have said regarding oral argument coupled with research on
oral argument and Supreme Court forecasting. Part III will
examine the variables to be included in this study, including
how information seeking will be measured, as well as lay out
the hypotheses that will be tested. Part IV will explain the
methodology for analyzing the oral argument transcripts.
Part V contains this study's findings and an analysis of those
findings, first looking at the data qualitatively and then
quantitatively. Finally, the article will end with concluding
remarks, limitations of the study, and directions for future
research.
II.BACKGROUND
A. JudicialBehavior
This part will first examine the relevant literature
regarding judicial behavior and decision making by reviewing
the three major models currently espoused by scholars of the
Court, as well as two lesser known models. Next, the
literature regarding oral argument will be investigated.
Finally, this section will present the literature surrounding
attempts to predict Justices' final votes on the merits.
Attempts to determine the reasoning behind the behavior
of Supreme Court Justices has led to three major schools of
thought. The oldest, the legal model, contends that "the
decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the
facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and
the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or
Whether a Justice is "employing a strict
precedent."6
constructionist, historical, natural law, or flexible approach to
constitutional interpretation and decision making," he or she
would follow the legal model. However, despite studies

6. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3, at 48.
7. Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using
Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1141, 1153 (2006).
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showing empirical evidence of "judicial blindness,"' this
traditional view has attracted significantly more detractors
than adherents among political scientists and no longer
dominates the field as it did earlier in the twentieth century,
though law professors tend to still advance this line of
thinking.9 One potential reason for the diminished role of the
legal model is that the Justices themselves may have
changed, with the legal model having more predictive
accuracy in the earlier part of the twentieth century.
Scholars have also argued that the legal model is limited
because it is only the most difficult cases-where both sides
have valid legal arguments and supporting case law-that
make it to the Supreme Court, and, thus, there is often not a
clear legal reason why one side should prevail over the
other.' ° But the legal model is not dead as Thomas Hansford
and James Spriggs have found that the most fundamental of
legal influences-precedent-still matters, and that ideology
interacts with precedent in determining the Court's
decisions."
Today, the leading view among scholars who study
the Supreme Court, though acknowledged sometimes
begrudgingly, 2 is the attitudinal model, which theorizes that
the behavior of Justices can be described and predicted by the
ideological values they hold."
Jeffrey Segal and Harold
Spaeth have been the leading proponents of this model, which
incorporates ideas from economics and psychology, as well as
political science and legal realism. 4 They found that there is
little attempt by Justices to persuade each other during the
initial, non-binding voting that occurs in conferences after
oral argument. 15 In addition, there is little statistical change
between this original vote and the final vote on the merits,"
8. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING 157 (1976).
9. See Lee Epstein, Introduction to the Symposium, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 757,

757(2004).
10. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1154.
11. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 128 (2006).

12. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, JurisprudentialRegimes in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305 (2002).
13. Segal et al., supra note 4, at 812.
14. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3.
15. Id. at 282-83.
16. Id. at 285.
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implying a Justice's values have largely, if not completely,
determined his or her vote without room for change.
Attitudinalists take issue with those who espouse the legal
model and claim that precedent is the basis for decisions,
arguing that "in many cases Supreme Court decision making
[J]ustices were
would look exactly the same whether
influenced by precedent or not."17
While obviously determining a Justice's ideological
leanings from opinions and voting records, and then using the
findings to predict future voting and measure whether a
Justice is voting in accord with his or her ideological
preferences poses problems with research validity, Jeffrey
Segal and Albert Cover found a creative way around this
dilemma by examining newspaper editorials on Justices
during their Senate confirmation hearings."i By determining
a particular Justice's values from sources outside the Justice
himself, and then comparing their findings to the Justice's
votes, Segal and Cover discovered that the attitudinal model
explains judicial behavior remarkably well.19 Regarding oral
argument, the attitudinal model would posit that oral
argument would not indicate who might win or lose a case,2 °
and oral argument would have little function other than to
potentially help a Justice clarify how a side in a case matches
the Justice's predetermined position on issues. Critics of the
attitudinal (or political) model contend that if ideology were
the only factor in judicial decision making, voting predictions
would be embarrassingly simple: conservatives would always
vote for the conservative side in a case and vice versa for
liberal Justices. On the contrary, some Justices shift in their
ideology over time, and other Justices, such as Justice
Kennedy, are liberal on some positions and conservative on
others.2" This has caused some scholars to posit that legal
and ideological factors "are both important considerations
that are inextricably linked to one another as the [Jiustices
interpret and shape the law."2

17. Id. at 289.
18. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).
19. Id. at 563.
20. ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 8, at 153.
21. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1154-55.
22. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 11, at 130.
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Therefore, a third theory of judicial behavior-the
strategic model-has been recently revived. First posited by
Walter Murphy in 1964 with his book Elements of Judicial
Strategy, Justices, like other political actors, seek the
implementation of personal policy preferences, but are limited
by more than legal factors such as the preferences of fellow
Justices, the norms and authority of the institution of the
Supreme Court, as well as external political and societal
factors.23 Murphy later examined how "a judge may by the
power of his intellect and the sheer force of his personality
lead his colleagues,"2 4 and concluded opinions of the Court are
mostly compromised settlements between the Justices,2"
finding further evidence for the strategic model.
For approximately three decades little research was done
in this vein, but the 1990s witnessed a flurry of scholarly
publishing promoting Supreme Court Justices as strategic
actors. Forrest Maltzman and Paul Wahlbeck found that
Justices do change their votes between the original vote at
conference and the final vote on the merits, concluding that
as strategic actors Justices can be susceptible to the
persuasive efforts of other Justices.2 6
Maybe the most
influential work supporting and reviving the strategic model
was Lee Epstein and Jack Knight's The Choices Justices
Make, which, maybe most significantly for this study, did not
examine oral argument in determining the strategic nature of
judicial behavior.2
Other studies have established that Justices act as
strategic actors by engaging in agenda setting via
sophisticated voting and gatekeeping regarding grants for
certiorari," as well as by expanding issues at the merits
stage.2 9 Focusing in on the Chief Justice, research has shown
that he exhibits strategic behavior by sometimes passing at
conference voting in order to determine how the voting will
23. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
24. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1568.
25. Id. at 1569.
26. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations
and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 581, 581 (1996).
27. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5.
28. Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 550 (1999).
29. Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issues, Agendas, and Decision
Making on the Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 853-54 (1996).
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come out in order to cast a vote for the winning side, 30 and by
sometimes giving writing assignments that undercut his
personal policy preferences in order to have a sure majority
coalition. 1 This highlights a difference between the strategic
and attitudinal models, as attitudinalists contend that
Justices may act interdependently until they cast their final
vote, where they vote their personal preference, whereas the
strategists argue that all along the way Justices engage in
strategic behavior because all the judicial choices require
interdependence.32
While the three models previously mentioned make up
the bulk of the judicial behavior and decision-making
literature, two other more recent models also exist. The
instrumental model looks at Supreme Court decision making
through the lens of its institutional position in relation to the
other branches of government, positing that the Court may
interpret law in the fearful shadow of reprisals from the
legislative branch, in particular, in the form of new legislation
reversing the Court, "threatening] impeachment, jurisdiction
restrictions, [and] other legislation limiting court powers and
reducing the courts' resources."3 3 Yet it is unclear how this
model is different than the strategic model, wherein the
Court acts in a calculated manner to bring about desired
policy outcomes within the confines imposed by external
agents.34
Finally, the behavioralist model explains the
aggregate decision making of the Court in light of individual
personalities and characteristics of the Justices."
Thus
"upbringing, religion, regional identity . . . law school
training" and legal experience prior to sitting on the bench
would all be potentially important explanatory factors. 6
Justice Breyer indirectly endorsed this model, as well as the
importance of ideology, when he stated in a 1997 television
30. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 39 LAW & SoCY REV. 349, 351 (2005).
31. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A ConditionalModel of Opinion
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551, 552 (2004).
32. Johnson et al., supra note 30, at 373.
33. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2001).
34. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 5.
35.

See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME

COURT (2006); Joel B. Grossman, Social Background and Judicial DecisionMaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
36. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1156.
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interview:
I'm a human being .... Because I'm a human being, my
own background ... my own views, will of course shape
me. They make a difference. Somebody with different life
experiences has different views to 37a degree; that will
influence the way they look at things.
More recently, and of a more controversial nature,
Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor made a strong
argument for behavioralism in stating that "our experiences
as women and people of color affect our decisions."38 She even
went on to claim that "a wise Latina woman with the richness
of her experiences would more often than not reach a better
conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."3 9
Obviously ideology would be one element of the behavioral
model, indicating some conceptual overlap between it and the
attitudinal and strategic models.
B. OralArgument
Not surprisingly, over the years Justices have voiced
their opinions of the value of oral argument, and in so doing
have shed light on how they themselves use oral argument in
the decision-making process. Justice Lewis F. Powell (19721987) claimed "the fact is, as every judge knows . . . oral
argument... does contribute significantly to the development
of precedents."4" Justice Robert H. Jackson (1941-1954)
concurred with his 1951 sentiments: "I think the Justices
would answer unanimously that now, as traditionally, they
rely heavily on oral presentations."4 1 Justice Harlan (19551971) declared to lawyers in 1955 that "oral argument on
appeal is perhaps the most effective weapon you have got."4 2
In 1928, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes (1910-1941)
noted that oral argument made it possible for the Court to
"more quickly ... separate the wheat from the chaff."43 And
37. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 131.
38. Sonia Sotomnayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87,
91 (2002).

39. Id. at 92.
40. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 571 (7th ed. 1993).

41. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for
Effective Case Presentations,37 A.B.A. J. 801, 801 (1951).
42. STERN ETAL.,supra note 40, at 11.

43. Id. at 570.
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Justice Blackmun (1970-1994) contended that a "good oralist
can add a lot to a case and help [us] in our later analysis of
what the case is all about .

. .

. Many times confusion [in the

brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say."
However, an examination of more recent Justices reveals
a potential shift in the Court's thinking. While few Justices
will claim that oral argument is useless, it appears to not
hold the important function earlier Justices ascribed to it.
Justice William 0. Douglas (1939-1975), though not a recent
Justice, stated, "I soon learned that ...

questioning from the

bench was . . . a form of lobbying for votes." 45 Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist (1972-2005), emphasizing that oral
argument matters only in certain cases, wrote:
Lawyers often ask me whether oral argument "really
makes a difference." Often the question is asked with an
undertone of skepticism, if not cynicism, intimating that
the judges have really made up their minds before they
ever come on the bench and oral argument is pretty much
of a formality. Speaking for myself, I think it does make a
difference: [i]n a significant minority of the cases in which
I have heard oral argument, I have left the bench feeling
differently about a case than I did when I came on the
bench. The change is seldom a full one-hundred-andeighty-degree swing, and I find that it is most likely to
occur in cases involving areas of law with which I am least
familiar.4 6
Rehnquist, though, noted a different feature of oral
argument that he felt had value:
But a second important function of oral argument can be
gleaned from the fact that it is the only time before
conference discussion of the case later in the week when
all of the judges are expected to sit on the bench and
concentrate on one particular case. The judges' questions,
although nominally directed to the attorney arguing the
case, may in fact be for the benefit of their colleagues.
Rehnquist's successor, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
44. Philippa

Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme

Court:

Conversations with Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298

(2000).
45.

PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE

SUPREME COURT 72 (1995).
46.

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243-44 (2001).

47. Id. at 244.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

(2005-present), expressed related ideas while a federal
appellate judge before his nomination to the Supreme Court,
arguing:
Oral argument matters, but not just because of what the
lawyers have to say. It is the organizing point for the
entire judicial process. The judges read the briefs, do the
research, and talk to their law clerks to prepare for the
argument. The voting conference is held right after the
oral argument-immediately after it in the court of
appeals, shortly after it in the Supreme Court. And
without disputing in any way the dominance of the
briefing in the decisional process, it is natural, with the
voting coming so closely on the heels of oral argument,
that the discussion at conference is going to focus on what
took place at argument.48
Thus, for Roberts, "oral argument is terribly, terribly
important."4 9 He also noted that generally there is no
discussion of a case prior to oral argument, and therefore oral
argument allows one to "begin to get a sense of what your
colleagues think of the case through their questions.""
Furthermore, for Roberts at least, oral argument is when his
ideas began to "crystallize," resulting in a formerly open mind
beginning "to close at oral argument," in favor of one side or
the other.5'
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993-present) confirmed
some of the ideas of Douglas, Rehnquist and Roberts by
pointing out that oral argument is a time when Justices seek
to persuade each other. 52 Justice Stevens (1975-present)
would not go so far as to view oral argument as a persuasive
tool, but did admit that during oral argument:
You often think of the oral arguments, you have a point in
mind that you think may not have been brought out in the
briefs well, that you want to be sure your colleagues don't
overlook. You ask a question to bring it out. And you are
not necessarily trying to sell everyone on the position but

48. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme
Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 70 (2005).
49. Id. at 69.
50. Id. at 70.
51. Id,
52. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L.
REV. 567, 569 (1999).
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you want everyone to at least have the point in mind.5 3
Justice Anthony Kennedy (1988-present) agreed with
Stevens, stating in a television interview that it would be a
mistake to view oral argument as a series of dialogues
between attorneys and Justices; in reality, he declared, "what
is happening is the court is having a conversation with itself
through the intermediary of the attorney."5 4
Lest such
comments devalue oral argument, however, Justice Kennedy
was quick to ask and answer attorneys' favorite question:
"Does oral argument make a difference? Of course it makes a
difference." 5
But almost as an afterthought, and as if
convincing himself, he added, "It has to make a difference." 6
Justice Antonin Scalia (1986-present), who once himself
likened oral argument to a "dog and pony show,"
has
changed his mind over the years as to oral argument's value,
though, he admits in the following excerpt from an interview
with Tim Russert, it seldom is the deciding factor:
RUSSERT: Has an oral argument ever changed your
mind?
SCALIA: Rarely. I think it has, but very rarely. What
happens not at all rarely, but with some frequency, is that
it's a very close case. You go in on the knife's edge. You
haven't made up your mind. And most lawyers don't
realize that. I think a lot of lawyers think that oral
argument is just a dog and pony show. You know, I've
read a [sixty]-page petitioner's brief, a [sixty]-page
respondent's brief, a [fortyl-page reply brief, as many
amicus briefs as I can stomach. What's somebody going to
tell me in half an hour? And the answer is, sometimes the
case is so close, that persuasive counselor, their oral
argument, can make the difference.58
But it is Justice Scalia's colleague, Justice Clarence
Thomas (1991-present), who is likely the most critical of oral
argument, stating that it is "not the real meat" of the role of

53. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 55 (2004).
54. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN

POLITICS 247 (7th ed. 2005).
55. Id. at 248.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 247.
58. Tim Russert, supra note 1.
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the Supreme Court. 59 Justice Thomas has also commented
that "I don't see the need for all those questions. I think
Justices, [ninety-nine] percent of the time, have their minds
made up when they go to the bench." 0 Such a statement, on
its surface, appears to give credence to the attitudinal model.
Thus there appears to have been a shift in the way
Justices talk about oral argument. Earlier in the twentieth
century, Justices, for the most part, seemed to see oral
argument as quite important-as something that often helped
decide a case. Later in the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first century more Justices now indicate that
occasionally oral argument is helpful, but usually it does not
persuade them to decide one way or the other. Instead the
importance of oral argument for the more recent Court is in
learning how the other Justices are thinking and maybe
influencing them, causing former U.S. Solicitor General
Walter Dellinger to argue that attorneys "need to be speaking
with not only the [Jiustice who has asked the question, but1
6
the one to whom the question is actually addressed."
Likewise, another former U.S. solicitor general, Ted Olson,
likened oral argument to "highly stylized Japanese theater"
because "[t]he Justices use questions to make points to their
colleagues."'" And experienced Supreme Court lawyer David
Frederick sees oral argument as a "'three-way' conversation"
between the Justice speaking, the attorney, and a "potentially
persuadable Justice."6 ' It is not surprising, therefore, that
"most lawyers can count on the fingers of one hand the
number of times oral argument actually seemed to make a
difference," and that "conventional wisdom holds that oral
argument is less important than in the past."64 When oral
argument provided a more important tool in gathering
information and making decisions, there appeared to have
been fewer questions from the bench. 65 Now, except for
59. Tony Mauro, When Planets Collide, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 10.
60. Terry Rombeck, Justice Takes Time for Q & A, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD,
Oct. 30, 2002, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2002/oct/30/justice.takes-time/.
61. Joan Biskupic, Justices Make Points by Questioning Lawyers, USA
TODAY, Oct. 6, 2006, at 7A.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Robert R. Salman, Oral Argument: Improving Appellate Advocacy, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 12, 1990, at 15.
65. See Biskupic, supra note 61.
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Justice Thomas, "every [J]ustice . . .tends to ask questions
aggressively '66 as they apparently seek to persuade each
other.
Until recently, more scholarly studies of oral argument
have had limited generality due to the anecdotal or case study
nature of the research, or the fact that the articles being
written were to aid lawyers preparing to argue before the
Court. For example, a study of the oral arguments in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill found that Justices assume
roles as either antagonists or protagonists during
questioning, and that "questions and comments by members
of the court ... are highly predictive of some of their judicial
opinions" with eight of the nine eventual opinions being
predictable from oral argument.
But the findings were
limited to only one case. Stephen Wasby, Anthony D'Amato,
and Rosemary Metrailer looked at the function that oral
argument plays in the Supreme Court, similarly finding
"strong parallels" between a Justice's remarks during
argument and his final position on cases.68 In looking at oral
arguments in school desegregation cases from 1954-1969, the
authors found that at times: "A judge may appear to be
asking the lawyer a question, but it may be a question in form
only, with the justice more intent on stating his position.
Judges may make a variety of observations which do not
necessarily require a response."6 9
They also noted the way Justices use oral arguments to
communicate with each other, via remarks to counsel, to
bring up points they want their fellow Justices to consider, or
to convince the other Justices that a particular aspect of an
argument will have to be resolved in order to decide for that
argument. 70 Given the lack of time devoted to discussion on
cases among the Justices, the authors viewed the use of oral
argument for discussion and persuasion among the Justices

66. O'BRIEN, supra note 54, at 247-48.
67. Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme
Court Advocacy: An Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 89, 136 (1978).
68. Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato & Rosemary Metrailer, The
Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q. J. SPEECH 410,
411(1976).

69. Id.
70. Id. at 418.
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as evidence of strategic behavior.71 But the authors did not
make an attempt to quantify their findings.
Examining oral argument from the viewpoint of the
advocate before the bench, Barrett Prettyman found an
increased use of hypothetical questions by the Court, which
the author postulated was possible evidence that Justices
were communicating with each other about the potential road
they could be on regarding a decision, and the future
implications of deciding a case in a certain way. Shapiro,
looking at oral argument more broadly, declared that Justices
use it to clarify the record, clarify the substance of claims,
clarify the scope of claims, examine the logic of claims,
examine the practical impact of claims, and lobby for or
against particular positions.73 He therefore, similar to others,
viewed oral argument as a type of "early conference" for the
Justices, noting that Justices who disagree with a position
will often ask the bulk of the questions, and that when one
Justice is particularly hammering on counsel, a Justice
sympathetic to counsel's position will often "intervene with a
friendly question," allowing counsel to "shift back to a more
fruitful line of argument.17

The article's observations

appeared to be essentially based on the author's extensive
experience before the Supreme Court.
Former solicitor general, Rex Lee, wrote a similar article
for practicing attorneys where he stated that oral argument
uniquely gives the Court "the opportunity to clarify facts
and to test the vulnerability of tentative theories and
approaches." 75

Likewise, Russell Galloway provided advice

and observations to his fellow attorneys in Trial magazine
after witnessing eleven Supreme Court oral arguments one
week.76 He, like others, pointed out the sometimes hostile,
confrontational nature of judicial questioning, noting that
when Thurgood Marshall got involved in oral argument, "he
71. See id. at 421.
72. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., The Supreme Court's Use of Hypothetical
Questions at OralArgument, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (1984).
73. Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 530-31 (1984).

74. Id. at 545, 547.
75. Rex E. Lee, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, 72 A.B.A. J., June
1986, at 60.
76. Russell W. Galloway, The Supreme Court: Oral Argument in the Court,
25 TRIAL, Dec. 1989, at 78-81.
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confront[ed] advocates with series of rapid-fire questions that
obviate response."7 7 Finally, John Brigham compared oral
argument to the Socratic method employed in law school
classrooms with the Justices acting as professors;7 8 and
Lawrence Baum focused on the rather un-conference-like
nature of post-oral argument conferences as Justices basically
state their position, and argued that to compensate for this
lack of discussion time, oral argument, much like others have
contended, becomes a quasi conference. 79 The author further
declared that Justices "use questions to frame cases in ways
intended to appeal to particular colleagues. More subtly,
[J]ustices regularly seek to make their points and expose the
weaknesses of positions with which they disagree in order to
sway colleagues who remain open to persuasion.""
But as valuable as these observations are, they do not
equate to more without concrete data to back them up.
Fortunately, such empirical evidence has begun to mount.
Neil McFeeley and Richard Ault, using content analysis
of oral argument transcripts, broke oral argument questions
into the following categories:
substantive questions,
repetition,
leading
questions,
procedural
questions,
tangential questions, hypothetical questions, statements
(substantive/factual, rephrasal, challenge, distortion, asides),
and interruptions.8 ' Their data revealed that three of the five
top categories dealt with statements rather than questions,
and concluded that a primary function of "oral argument is
making one's own views known."82 Examining the link
between oral argument and per curiam, one study of a
random sample of 318 cases found increased questioning by
Justices in cases that later were issued per curiam, and
theorized that oral argument could be used at times by the
Justices to rid themselves of cases without having to
determine the merits.83
77. Id. at 78.
78. See Symposium, May It Please the Court... , LAW & CTS., Spring 1995,
at 3.
79. See id. at 4.
80. Id.
81. Neil D. McFeeley & Richard J. Ault, Supreme Court Oral Argument: An
ExplanatoryAnalysis, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 52, 61-64 (1979).
82. Id. at 71.
83. Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Supreme Court's Use of Per Curiam
Dispositions: The Connection to Oral Argument, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 1-3
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Chief Justice John Roberts, after his appointment as a
federal appellate judge, but before his appointment to the
Supreme Court, penned an article wherein he focused on the
importance of oral argument.8 4 As part of his study he
examined fourteen cases from the 1980 term and fourteen
from the 2003 term to test a hypothesis he had developed that
parties that get the most attention from Justices in the form
of questions or statements actually fare the worst.8 5 He found
that in twenty-four of the twenty-eight cases, the side that
lost was asked the most questions, leading to a prediction
success rate of eighty-six percent. 86 He concluded from the
results, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that "the secret to
successful advocacy is simply to get the Court to ask your
opponent more questions." 87
Ironically, journalist Tony
Mauro looked at the twenty-five cases in the 2006 term that
resulted in five-to-four decisions, and found that Chief Justice
Roberts asked an average of only 3.6 questions of the side he
eventually voted for, and 14.3 questions of the side he
opposed. 8
A more recent study of ten Supreme Court cases studied
the judicial patterns of question asking by placing the
questions into four categories: total questions, questions
asked in each case, questions asked by Justices of the side
they eventually voted for, and questions asked by Justices of
the side they eventually voted against.8 9 The questions were
also ranked on a scale of one to five, with lower scores
indicating helpful questions and higher scores indicating
hostility by the Justice. 90 Creating a profile for each Justice,
the study determined that in general Justices ask more
questions of the side they eventually rule against, as well as
display a greater degree of measurable hostility towards the

(1992).
84. Roberts, supra note 48.
85. Id. at 75.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Tony Mauro, When In Doubt, Look to Roberts for Outcome of Supreme
Court
Case,
LEGAL
TIMES,
July
19,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1184058397113.

2007,

available

at

89. Sarah L. Shullman, The Illusion of Devil's Advocacy: How the Justices of
the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral Argument, 6 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271, 274 (2004).

90. Id. at 273.
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side they oppose. 9'
Edward Carter and James Phillips
performed content analysis on thirty-one cases ranging from
the 1960s to the 2000s where newspapers were litigants.9 2
They simply counted the number of declarations and
questions from the Court per side in each case. They found
the Court treated newspaper parties and non-newspaper
parties relatively equally except for when newspapers were
respondents in a case. 93
In such instances newspaper
respondents received a statistically significant higher number
of declarations compared to interrogatories than their nonnewspaper opponents.
Taking a more interdisciplinary approach, scholars have
looked at oral argument from a biosocial angle, noting that
about one-third of a Justice's speaking turns were found to
deal with an argument's validity, revealing the importance of
persuasion between Justices in oral argument.9 4
David
Gibson, a sociolinguist, investigated the way people interrupt
others for strategic purposes.95 He found that Supreme Court
Justices progress their own goals "at the expense" of the
arguing attorneys. 96 Two of Gibson's notable patterns occur
when: (1) Justices interrupt to criticize one aspect of an
attorney's argument without having to extend the critique to
broader aspects that might support the argument in question;
and (2) interruptions "subvert whatever [the attorney]
intended to say, if only temporarily, while permitting the
[J]ustices the opportunity to score rhetorical points that
might not have found an opening, nor have been as effective,
later on. 9 7
From psychology Lawrence Wrightsman looked at oral
argument as part of his book-length study on the Supreme
Court's psychology. 9
He surmised that "[t]he [J]ustices'
motivations behind their questions are diverse and difficult to

91. Id. at 274, 278.
92. Edward L. Carter & James C. Phillips, Justices Treat Newspapers
Differently in Oral Argument, 29 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 90 (2008).

93. Id. at 95.
94. James N. Schubert et al., Observing Supreme Court Oral Argument: A
BiosocialApproach, 11 POL. & LIFE SCI. 35 (1992).
95. David
R.
Gibson,
Opportunistic Interruptions: Interactional

VulnerabilitiesDerivingfrom Linearization,68 SoC. PSYCHOL. Q. 316 (2005).
96. Id. at 316.
97. Id. at 331.
98. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35.
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discern" as a "question may reflect hostility more than it
reflects a genuine desire to know the answer," whereas
"another Justice may use questions to clarify his or her
thoughts on the issue. " " Drawing on the work of Aaron
Hull, °° Wrightsman divided question types into three
categories: affirming (those that aid an attorney or invoke
new thoughts or directions), inquisitive (focusing on just the
facts of a case), and challenging (interruptions of counsel that
are abrupt and harsh in tone).' 0 ' These question types are
related to the four major question types delineated by
experienced Supreme Court bar member David Frederick in
his The Art of Oral Advocacy: (1) background questions, (2)
questions regarding the scope of the advocated rule, (3)
questions involving the implications of the advocated rule,
and (4) questions stemming from a Justice's idiosyncrasies.' 2
Wrightsman turned his full attention to oral argument in
his book Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court: An
Empirical Approach. 1 3 He pointed out six main elements of
oral argument:
1. The [J]ustices are in control and hold the power. If the
analogy of a "conversation" is maintained, it is more like
that between a superior and a subordinate.
2. The standard operating procedure permits the
[J]ustices to interrupt counsel at any time. They may
make statements as well as questions, they may make
comments back and forth to each other, they may change
the topic at will without apology, and they may focus on
rather trivial aspects of the case. The ground rules of
ordinary conversation are routinely violated.
3. Because advocates are in the position of supplicants,
they must tolerate abuses of the traditional social
exchange out of the fear of gaining the ire, or the further
99. Id. at 74.
100. Aaron Hull, Strategic Interaction and Schema: An Integration and
Study of Judicial Decision-Making Models (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Department of Political Science, University of Kansas), cited in
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 74-75.
101. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 74-75.
102. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Forwardto DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF
ORAL ADVOCACY 70 (2003) (displaying, as an example, Justice Blackman asking
questions about a Minnesota state park that had little to do with the issue at
hand).
103. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH (2008).
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ire, of a [Jiustice or [Jiustices.
4. The give-and-take during an oral argument is like no
other phenomenon in regard to the number of exchanges
per minute, the number of interruptions, and the shifts
from one questioner to another.
5. An oral argument is an atypical conversation, not one
between two friends who see each other at a cocktail party
and catch up on recent developments in their lives. The
[Jiustices know quite a bit about the advocate's position; it
is not a conversation that begins at the beginning but
rather reflects a great deal of shared knowledge between
the two participants.
6. To continue the analogy of a cocktail party, the Court
values some guests more than others .

some tension between
advocate ....

[a Justice]

.

. there may be

and

[a] frequent

Likewise, some advocates, because of their

reputation or their entrenched position in the Supreme
Court bar, get cut some slack.' °4
Wrightsman also identified eight potential motives for
why Justices ask the questions or make the statements they
do: (1) to try to learn information they feel is not contained in
the briefs or lower court's ruling, (2) to seek clarification of a
party's position, (3) to highlight weaknesses in an attorney's
argument, (4) to inject a contradictory viewpoint into the
discussion, (5) to discover what are the implications or
boundaries of an attorney's argument, (6) to help an attorney
by providing support, (7) to reduce tension or add humor, and
(8) to speak with other Justices through the attorney.'0 5
For his study, Wrightsman selected twenty-four cases
from the 2004 term, purposively choosing twelve cases where
ideology would be salient, such as issues dealing with
abortion, minority rights or federalism for example, and
twelve cases where ideology would be irrelevant. 10 6 Due to
interruptions that resulted in incomplete sentences,
Wrightsman did not analyze each sentence a Justice uttered.
Instead he looked at each Justice's prompt in an oral
argument transcript which indicates where a Justice is
speaking uninterrupted, and which can obviously contain
multiple sentences. With another coder, Wrightsman
104. Id. at 67-68.
105. Id. at 77-80.
106. Id. at 138.
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attempted
to
rate
each
prompt
as
sympathetic,
unsympathetic or neutral, but they found too many mixed
examples. Instead they took a more holistic approach, rating
each Justice as to which side to whom he or she generally
addressed
unsympathetic
questions
and
comments.
Wrightsman hypothesized that " [J]ustices' questions are more
likely to be predictive in those cases where ideology is
central" under the theory that Justices "seek support for their
own positions by asking questions that emphasize one side
and... play devil's advocate by asking questions that test the
weaknesses of the other side.""°7 His findings corroborated
his hypothesis.
Possibly the most prolific scholar empirically exploring
oral argument of late is Timothy Johnson. In 2001, he
examined seventy-five cases where he compared the
information being presented in briefs and amicus curiae to
the topics being discussed in oral arguments, to the points
made in each case's majority opinion.' 8 Johnson found that a
significant minority of topics discussed in oral arguments
were never mentioned in the briefs or amicus curiae, and
later were mentioned in the written opinions. Johnson
concluded that oral arguments play a vital informationgathering role for Justices, who as strategic actors, desire
outcomes as close as possible to their policy preferences, but
are limited in the briefs and amicus curiae to only the
information that attorneys want the Justices to see. However,
Johnson's conclusion rests on the assumption that the topics
the Court discussed unique to oral arguments were largely
explored through substantive questions from the Justices
instead of leading questions or flat out declarations
attempting to persuade other Justices. It may have been that
Justices introduced topics in oral argument on which they
were not seeking additional information from the attorneys,
but that they wanted to bring up for their fellow Justices to
consider because the issues were not mentioned by attorneys
in the briefs.
Later, Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs
inspected the ratings of attorneys Justice Blackmun made in
his notes during oral arguments from 1970 to 1994.109 They
107. Id. at 137-38.
108. Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court
Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331 (2001).
109. Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs II, The
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found the better an attorney does in oral argument, the
increased likelihood that attorney will win the case, even
after taking into account all other factors. Thus, they
contended that oral arguments do make a difference in a
case's outcome.
Johnson expanded his research with the landmark book
Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States
Supreme Court."' By examining the oral argument notes of
Justice Powell, Johnson found that, at least for Powell, oral
arguments provided an opportunity to determine what other
Justices' inclinations are in a particular case. Johnson's
research also revealed that "almost one-third of all references
to oral arguments were made to issues discussed during those
proceedings but not in the written legal briefs," and concluded
that oral arguments can "provide unique information the
[J]ustices use when they make substantive choices about the
merits of a case.""'
Johnson, Ryan Black, Jerry Goldman, and Sarah Treul
conducted the largest and most systematic study on oral
argument to date, analyzing oral argument transcripts in all
cases from 1979-1995.112 They found that Justices have
grown more active in oral argument over that time period,
with the number of sentences spoken to each side increasing
from about 110 to nearly 150, and the average number of
words spoken by Justices nearly doubling. The authors
attempted predictions from the data patterns they found for
oral argument and discovered that the probability of
reversing a lower court decision significantly decreases as the
Court asks more questions and makes more statements to a
petitioner in a case even after controlling for other possible
In cases where Justices asked the same
explanations.
number questions of both sides, the authors found a 0.64
probability of reversal, but in cases where Justices asked fifty
more questions of the petitioning attorney than his or her
counterpart, the probability drops to 0.39. Johnson and his
Influence of Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
99(2006).
110. JOHNSON, supra note 53.
111. Id. at 122.
112. Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black, Jerry Goldman, & Sarah A. Treul,
Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at
Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241
(2009).
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colleagues found the same results when using word counts as
a predictor of case outcomes. The greater the discrepancy
between the number of words spoken to two parties, the lower
the probability a side receiving more verbal attention from
Justices would prevail. In summary they declare: "The
analysis we present here is clear: when Justices pay more
attention to one side during oral arguments, that side is much
more likely to lose its case."" 3 Such findings are in line with
previous research." 4
Moving beyond the quantity of verbal activity to its
quality, much like Shullman's hostility scale".. or
Wrightsman's unsympathetic-sympathetic coding," 6 Treul,
Black, and Johnson looked at the same range of cases as in
their other study, 1979-1995, and used linguistic software to
measure the emotional content of remarks made by the
Justices, hypothesizing that more unpleasant language
against a party will lower the probability of that party
prevailing. 1 17 Their findings confirmed their hypothesis.
Both of these massive quantitative oral arguments
studies are commendable, but potentially suffer from two
related weaknesses. First, there is the possible occurrence of
ecological fallacy, wherein aggregate-level data is used to
make inferences about individuals." 8 While scholars may be
careful to avoid this by stating that it is the Court and not
individual Justices acting in a certain way, the inferences by
readers are likely to fall into this trap. Just because the
Court may ask more questions of or use more unpleasant
language with a losing side, does not mean that the majority
of Justices are doing so.
Second, and related to the first concern, dominant
Justices skew the data. When certain Justices, such as
Justice Frankfurter or Justice Scalia, monopolize verbal

113. Id.
114. See Roberts, supra note 48; Shullman, supra note 89.
115. Shullman, supra note 89, at 273.
116. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 74-75.
117. Treul, Black, and Johnson presented these findings in Jekyll and Hyde
Questions from the Bench: Does the Emotional Nature of Justices' Questions
Affect Their Votes on the Merits?, at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, Illinois on April 4, 2009. The paper can be found
at the Social Science Research Center, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407518
118. PHILIP H. POLLOCK III, THE ESSENTIALS OF POLITICAL ANALYsIS 12 (2d
ed. 2005).
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activity with a particular attorney, it makes it appear that
the Court is behaving in a fashion that is in reality only
representative of maybe one or two Justices. Thus, we may
learn something in general about the Court, but we still do
not know whether it is because that is how most or only a few
of the Justices behave during oral argument. However,
Justice-level analysis is only possible from 1963-1965 and
2004-present due to the fact that the names of the speaking
Justices are identified instead of a generic "Question" or
"Court." Justice-level analysis outside those time periods is
difficult unless one goes through each transcript while
listening to that particular case's oral argument, documenting
which Justice is speaking.
C. Supreme Court Forecasting
Numerous scholars and other observers of the Court have
attempted to predict Supreme Court case outcomes based on
a host of factors, including oral argument behavior. In fact,
the entire premise of the attitudinal model-that Justices
vote based almost purely on ideology-is itself a forecasting
model. Linda Greenhouse, based on her observations of oral
argument behavior of Justices during sixteen cases in the
2002 term, accurately predicted twelve (seventy-five percent)
case outcomes. 119
Shullman accurately predicted the
outcomes of three cases from the 2002 term after counting the
questions posed by each Justice to each side in seven previous
cases. 12 From this exercise Shullman concluded "that one
might profitably use an analysis of [the] questions [of
Justices] to predict what was previously thought to be
unpredictable."' 21 And as already noted, then Circuit Judge
Roberts argued from his observations of twenty cases that the
side that receives more attention during oral argument tends
to lose. 2 2 While notable, these studies suffer from simple
deficits in social science research protocol-non-random,
small sample sizes.
In an attempt to pit legal experts who observe the Court
closely against the cool calculations of statistical modeling,
119.
(2004).
120.
121.
122.

Linda Greenhouse, Press Room Predictions, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 781, 782
Shullman, supra note 89.
Id. at 293.
Roberts, supra note 48, at 75.
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Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, Theodore Ruger, and Pauline
Kim created a study entitled the Supreme Court Forecasting
Project."' Eighty-three experts, seventy-one from academia
and twelve who were appellate attorneys took part in this
project. Of this group, thirty-eight had clerked on the
Supreme Court, thirty-three were chaired professors, and five
were or had been law school deans. They found that the
statistical model was more accurate than human experts in
predicting case outcomes generally (seventy-five percent
correct versus 59.1 percent correct), and that the experts did
slightly better than the model when forecasting the votes of
the Justices (67.9 percent correct versus 66.7 percent correct).
Breaking down cases by issues, the statistical model made
more accurate predictions than the legal experts in case
outcomes and individual Justice votes involving civil rights,
criminal procedure, and economic activity, but the experts
trumped the computer in cases involving judicial power and
federalism. The authors wrote:
One motivation for this study was to determine whether
there are some kinds of cases where observable "legal"
factors are more important for the prediction of outcomes.
Our results in the judicial power cases suggest
that this is
1 4
an area where "legal" factors are important. 1
Oral arguments were not included in the calculations
of either the statistical model or the legal experts.
Interestingly, Greenhouse, on a smaller sample of cases,
achieved a similar success rate as the computer-seventy-five
percent. 12' This caused legal scholar Lee Epstein to declare
that Greenhouse's "success at prediction should cause many
of us to reconsider explanations of judicial decisions that fail
to take notice of [oral arguments]."26

The Supreme Court Forecasting Project is not without its
critics. Miriam Cherry and Robert Rogers noted despite the
study's "sophisticated empirical and statistical approach," the
123. See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline
T. Kim, Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2
PERS. ON POL. 761 (2004); see also Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew
D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court ForecastingProject: Legal
and PoliticalScience Approaches to PredictingSupreme Court Decisionmaking,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
124. Martin et al., supra note 123, at 766.
125. Greenhouse, supra note 119, at 782.
126. Epstein, supra note 9, at 758.
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fact that only a few experts were involved in the prediction of
each case (from one to three) make it "premature to conclude
that the computer model had triumphed over the decisions of
human beings, and it would be hasty to trumpet the
127
ascendance of the [attitudinal] model over the legal model."
Nor do Cherry and Rogers espouse the current methods of
prediction used by legal scholars, arguing that such
"approaches tend to be individualized" because "scholars work
in isolation, and these individual hunches, guesses, and
judgments are never aggregated or integrated," and the
"predictions are not verifiable or falsifiable in any statistical
sense."128 Instead, the authors recommend the adoption of an
information market model wherein individual knowledge is
organized and compiled on a much larger scale. In addition,
while praising the "imagination," "commitment," and
"stunning results" of the Supreme Court Forecasting Project,
Susan Silbey worried "that the statistical analysis of [CIourt
decisions makes the law appear to be less of a collective moral
accomplishment than it is, contributing inadvertently to
increasing juridification 1 29 rather than the rule of law."'130
This study, therefore, seeks to fill a niche in the oral
argument literature in four ways. First, previous studies
have largely glossed over oral argument transcripts from the
1960s. The only known studies to include any type of content
analysis of 1960s material were Stephen Wasby, Anthony
D'Amato, and Rosemary Metrailer's examination of oral
arguments in school desegregation cases,' 3 ' and Carter and

127. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1157.

128. Id. at 1152.
129. Regarding juridification:
In descriptive terms some see juridification as "the proliferation of law"

or as "the tendency towards an increase in formal (or positive, written)
law"; others as "the monopolization of the legal field by legal
professionals", the "construction of judicial power", "the expansion of
judicial power" and some quite generally link juridification to the
spread of rule guided action or the expectation of lawful conduct, in any
setting, private or public.

Lars C. Blichner & Anders Molander, What is Juridification? 2 (Arena Ctr.
for
Eur. Stud.,
Working
Paper No.
14,
2005), available at
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05-14.pdf.
130. Susan S. Silbey, The Dream of a Social Science: Supreme Court
Forecasting,Legal Culture, and the Public Sphere, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 785, 786
(2004).
131. Wasby et al., supra note 68.
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Phillips's look at oral argument in newspaper cases. 13 1
However, for both of these studies the actual number of cases
drawn from the 1960s was small and incidental to the study,
and no comparison was made between 1960s cases and those
from other decades. This study specifically targets the 1960s
to get a better idea of the predictors and function of oral
argument during that decade, and looks at differences in
comparing the 1960s to the 2000s.
Second, this study is the first to utilize inferential
statistical analysis of individual Justices during oral
arguments. Other studies have looked at individual Justice
behavior during oral argument 133 or performed inferential
statistical analysis of oral argument behavior,' but never
both. Third, this is the only known study of oral argument
involving cases specifically related to the freedoms of speech
and press. Fourth, while previous studies have measured the
number of questions asked, 35 the hostility of a Justice's
remarks, 3 6 the sympathetic nature of a Justice's comments
and questions,137 and the degree of unpleasant emotional
content in the Court's speech, 138 no study has ever attempted
to measure the degree of information seeking that Justices
are engaging in during oral argument.
III. SPECIFIC AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

This study's analysis consists of three parts. First, it will
examine potential factors predicting judicial behavior during
oral argument.
Second, it will explore how well oral
argument behavior predicts voting. Third, this article will
investigate whether or not the degree of information seeking
is different in the 1960s as compared to the 2000s. To
measure the behavior of the Justices during oral argument in
a meaningful way, two variables were created to measure
information seeking because of the varied explanations that
the different theoretical models would use to explain. The
132. Carter & Phillips, supra note 92.
133. See WRIGHTSMAN, supra 35; Greenhouse, supra note 119; Mauro, supra
note 88; Shullman, supra note 89.
134. See Johnson et al., supra note 10; Johnson et al., supra note 112.
135. See Mauro, supra note 88; Johnson et al., supra note 112; Roberts, supra
note 48.
136. See Shullman, supra note 89.
137. See WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35.

138. See Johnson et al., supra note 112.
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legal model would argue that information seeking is the main
function of oral argument, the attitudinal model would posit
that information seeking is nonexistent during oral
argument, and the strategic model would contend that
information seeking is dependent on the side the Justice is
interacting with.
For the first measure of information seeking, an ordinal
scale was created based on literature from various disciplines
related to questioning. In his study of examination and crossexamination, J.T. Dillon noted that question types existed "on
a continuum of control," with broader questions less
controlling of an answer than narrow questions, whquestions (who, what, when, where, why, etc.) are less
controlling than simple yes/no questions, and yes/no
questions less controlling than tag, or leading, questions. 13 9
He also observed that "cross-examiners know the answers to
the questions they ask. Their practice positively requires
them not to ask a question to which they do not know the
answer. The rule of thumb runs,
'Never ask a question unless
140
,,
answer.'
the
know
already
you
In her study of power and linguistic manipulation in
courtrooms, Anne Graffam Walker noted that questioning
was less about seeking the truth than about winning a
case, and that power is exerted through controlling
witnesses during examination. 1 41 If seeking new information,
questioners ask whquestions. 142
If, however, the
questioner wants to influence the direction or content of
solicited information, then yes/no or disjunctive questions are
employed (a disjunctive question provides a possible answer
in the question itself, but then adds some phrase to the end of
the question, such as "or something else," to allow the
4
respondent some leeway in answering). 1
Yanrong Chang found that questions in the courtroom
are often used not to obtain information but to persuade, with
persuasive questioning taking on the form of "(i) repeating

139. J.T. DILLON, THE PRACTICE OF QUESTIONING 20 (1990).

140. Id. at 135.
141. Anne Graffam Walker, Linguistic Manipulation, Power, and the Legal
Setting, in POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE 57 (Leah Kedar ed., Ablex Publishing
1987).

142. Id. at 69.
143. Id. at 72-73.
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key questions, (ii) invalidating excuses or accounts, (iii)
asking unanswerable questions, (iv) supplying answers, and
(v) paraphrasing or restating . . . responses."'
Sandra
Harris divided courtroom questions into two types: whinterrogatives and other interrogatives (bipolar or yes/no,
disjunctive, and tag). 4 5 While some might argue that the
questioning between lawyers and witnesses, or even judges
and witnesses, in a trial courtroom is not relevant to the
questioning between Justices and attorneys in the Supreme
Court, we contend that the Justices do very much treat the
attorneys as witnesses, often appearing to be attempting to
either get information out of them, when in fact the Justices
are usually leading the attorneys along to extract either a
damaging admission or a helpful insight.
Irene Koshik argued that rhetorical questions "are
designed to convey assertions, rather than seek new
information," and that leading questions can be a form of
declarative or non-information-seeking question.14 6 Stephen
Levinson noted the complexity of legal questioning when he
stated that in the courtroom:
[T]he questioner hopes to elicit a response that will count
as part of an implicit argument .... The questions may be
rhetorical, in the sense that both know the answer . . .
they may appear to seek information when in fact the
information is already known . . .or they may appear to
merely seek 7 confirmation when in fact they seek
information."
Ronald Adler, Lawrence Rosenfeld, and Russell Proctor
148
divided questions into two types: sincere or counterfeit.
They defined sincere questions as those whose aim is to
understand others. Sincere questions, they argued, usually
perform the following functions: clarify meanings, learn about

144. Yanrong Chang, Courtroom Questioning as a Culturally Situated
Persuasive Genre of Talk, 15 DISCOURSE & SOC'Y 705, 705 (2004).
145. Sandra Harris, Questions as a Mode of Control in Magistrates' Courts,
49 INT'L J. SOC. LANG. 5 (1984).
146. IRENE
KOSHK,
BEYOND
RHETORICAL
QUESTIONS IN EVERYDAY INTERACTION 1 (2005).

QUESTIONS:

ASSERTIVE

147. Stephen C. Levinson, Activity Types and Language, 17 LINGUISTICS 365,
383(1979).
148. RONALD B. ADLER, LAWRENCE B. ROSENFELD & RUSSELL F. PROCTOR II,
INTERPLAY: THE PROCESS OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 153 (9th ed.
2001).

2010]

"DOGAND PONY SHOW"

109

the thoughts and feelings of others, encourage elaboration,
encourage discovery, and gather more facts and details. They
argue that open rather than closed questions make
interrogatories more sincere. On the other hand, they define
counterfeit questions as questions that "are really disguised
attempts to send a message, not receive one."149 Counterfeit
questions, they contend, include questions that trap the
speaker, questions that make statements, questions that
carry hidden agendas, questions that seek "correct" answers,
and questions based on unchecked assumptions.
Placing question types on a continuum of options
available to the respondent, Mark Redmond specified the two
extremes of the continuum as demonstrating either openness
(numerous answer possibilities) or closedness (only one
possible answer). 150 He also clarified that open questions will
likely begin with words such as who, what, when, where,
why, how or tell me. More specifically, Redmond defined
bipolar questions as yes/no, true/false, right/wrong,
agree/disagree or any type of question wherein only two
According to
possible answers are presented or exist.
Redmond, bipolar questions are a closed type of question
since they are "highly directive . . . . The amount of
information gained from [bipolar] questions is very limited,"
and "bipolar questions force individuals to give answers that
Additionally,
do not really reflect their thoughts."1 5 1
Redmond classified leading or tag questions as non-questions
because such questioning does not genuinely seek
information.
Using this literature from psychology, linguistics,
philosophy, law, sociology and interpersonal communication,
a six-point scale was created to measure the degree of
information-seeking behavior Justices engage in during oral
argument (see figure 1). The lower the score, the higher the
level of information seeking engaged in by the Justices.
Examples and explanations of each level are provided in table
1.

149. Id. at 151-53.
150. MARK V. REDMOND, COMMUNICATION: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS
220-21(2000).
151. Id. at 220.
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Close-ended
3
Bipolar

Non-questions
4
5
6
Tag/Leading Rhetorical Declaration

Figure 1. Diagram of information-seeking scale.

By utilizing content analysis, a methodology some legal
scholars have argued should be embraced more in legal
studies, 15 2 each sentence in an oral argument transcript was
coded based on the scale below, and then an average for each
Justice per case side was calculated (if a Justice did not speak
to the attorneys for a side, no score was possible).
Table 1. Explanations and examples of information-seeking scale.
Level's
Vclue
Name
Explanation
1
Wh- question An open-ended question
using who, what,
when, where, why, or
how
2
Disjunctive
A closed question with
question
an add-on that allows
room to answer more
openly
3

4

5

6

Example
In what way are you
claiming the First
Amendment applies to
this case?
Are you claiming the
First Amendment
applies to this case, or
are you claiming
something else?
A
question
with
only
two
Are
you claiming the
Bipolar
question
answer options, such
First Amendment
as yes/no, true/false,
applies to this case?
etc.
Tag or Leading A leading question,
You are claiming the
question
usually framed in the
First Amendment
negative, that implies
applies to this case, are
a certain answer
you not?
Rhetorical
A question that does not How in the world am I
question
have an answer or
supposed to believe
where an answer is
your claim that the
not sought
First Amendment
applies to this case?
A statement without a
Declaration
The First Amendment
question mark
does not apply to this
case.

152. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of
JudicialOpinions, 96 CAL. L. REv. 63 (2008).
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A second way to operationalize information seeking is by
quantity rather than quality. A Justice may not ask different
types of questions (including non-questions) of a particular
side so much as speak more to a side he or she supports or
opposes. Therefore, a word count for each Justice per side
was created. Conceptually the two variables are different. A
correlation test confirmed that there was only moderate
correlation between information-seeking scores and word
counts in the 1960s cases (r = 0.34, p < 0.01) and the cases
from the 2000s (r = 0.28, p < 0.01).
Given that the legal model would support the contention
that attorney-specific or case-related factors should influence
judicial behavior, four such variables were included in this
study. Previous scholars have found that attorney experience
influences the decisions of the Justices," 3 with Richard
Lazarus arguing that a Supreme Court bar has reemerged
and that "more effective advocates influence the development
of the law. 15 4 An attorney experience variable was created
with a "1" indicating it was the attorney's first appearance
before the Court, a "2" representing an attorney's second
appearance before the Court, and so on. Data for attorneys
appearing in the 1960s cases was found through name
searches on Lexis Nexis, and the number of appearances of
attorneys from the 2000s was found on www.oyez.org.
The second variable is whether or not a particular side in
a case is represented during oral argument by an attorney
from the solicitor general's office. The solicitor general is
often referred to as the tenth Justice given the office's
intimate relationship with the Court. 155 Many have argued
that the solicitor general experiences more success than other

153. See John Szmer, Susan W. Johnson & Tammy A. Sarver, Does the
Lawyer Matter?: Influencing Outcomes on the Supreme Court of Canada, 41
LAW & Socy REV. 279 (2007).
154. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487,
1487 (2008). Some, though, contend that it is the previous success of litigators
before the Court and not just their experience that really matters. Stacia L.
Haynie & Kaitlyn L. Sill, Experienced Advocates and Litigation Outcomes:
Repeat Players in the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, 60 POL. RES. Q.
443, 443 (2007).
155. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND

THE RULE OF LAW 3-4 (1987).
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attorneys, 5 6 though some dispute this claim 5 ' or contend that
it is no longer valid given the increasing partisanship of the
office. 58 This variable is coded "1" if a solicitor general's office
attorney argues for a side, whether as the main party or as
amicus, and "0" if not.
The third attorney-specific variable represents whether
an amicus party has been allowed to supplement a standing
party's argument during oral argument. Being granted
amicus status for oral argument is rare given the number of
parties on each side that attempt to become an amicus party
before the court and the fact that a party in a case must59
acquiesce to giving up some of its precious argument time.'
Therefore, this potentially indicates that the Justices are
interested in the viewpoint of the amicus party, potentially
creating increased persuasive influence for a side with an
amicus attorney. Scholars have argued that amicus parties
are influential because they shape "the flow of information at
the Court."6 ° Therefore, some posit that amicus parties
elevate the probability of a successful case outcome,' 6 1 while
others find no such benefit from amicus parties. 162 Some
might contend that amicus parties signal ideology, and
therefore are more related to the strategic model than the
legal model, but Collins found that the Court uses amicus
16
curiae for information rather than ideological signaling.'
The amicus variable is also a dummy variable with a "1"
meaning an attorney from an amicus party argued on a

156. See Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from
the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 72 (2005).
157. Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 505 (1998).
158. Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization
in the Solicitor General's Office, 71 J. POL. 224 (2009).
159. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Participationin U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 807, 809(2004).
160. Paul M. Collins & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest Group Participation,
Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
955 (2007); see also Collins, supra note 159.
161. Collins, supra note 159; Paul M. Collins Jr., Lobbyists before the U.S.
Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL.
RES. Q. 55 (2007).
162. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the
Courts: Amicus Participationin the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993).
163. Collins, supra note 159.
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particular side, and a "0" indicating the absence of an amicus
attorney.
Finally, Justices may treat petitioners and respondents
differently, either because petitioners have a harder road to
travel because they seek for the court to overturn a lower
ruling, or because the court, by hearing the case, is signaling
that they are not comfortable with the lower court's ruling,
creating a more challenging environment for the respondent.
Therefore a petitioner variable was created with "1'
indicating the petitioner's side in a case and "0" representing
the respondent's side. This leads to four hypotheses about
possible predictors of oral argument information seeking
(conceptually defined as behavior engaged in to gain
additional information from litigants):
Hla: The experience level of attorneys on a particular side
in a case should be a statistically significant predictor of
information seeking during oral argument.
Hlb: Whether or not an attorney from the solicitor
general's office argues on a particular side in a case should
be a statistically significant predictor of information
seeking during oral argument.
Hic: Whether or not an attorney from an amicus party
argues on a particular side in a case should be a
statistically significant predictor of information seeking
during oral argument.
Hid: Whether or not a particular side is the petitioner
should be a statistically significant predictor of
information seeking.
To investigate the strategic model, ideology scores were
included in three forms. These variables were created from
the Martin-Quinn scores for each Justice. 164 These scores are
calculated annually and are continuous in nature, with
liberal Justices found on the negative end of the scale and
conservative Justices found on the positive side of the scale.
For this particular study, the most liberal score was Justice
Douglas's 1964 Martin-Quinn score wherein he received a
-5.581.
The most conservative score was Justice Scalia's
2004 score of 2.85. While reverse causality should not be a

164. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL.
ANALYsIS 134 (2002).
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problem 165 given the variables that will be used to measure
oral argument behavior, the scores were lagged one year just
to be safe, with 2004 scores used to predict 2005 oral
argument behavior and other factors. The only exceptions to
this were the first years on the bench of Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Fortas, as there were no
Martin-Quinn scores available from the previous term.
Additionally, ideology was operationalized three different
ways. First, the straight Martin-Quinn scores were used,
which measure both direction and magnitude of ideology.
Second, a dummy variable was created from the scores with a
"1" indicating a conservative score and a "0" indicating a
liberal score to just measure magnitude and not intensity.
Third, the absolute value of the Martin-Quinn score was used
as a variable in order to look at intensity and not direction. 6 '
Additionally, to test for the influence of ideology, a
dummy variable was created to determine whether Justices
treated the side in a case that matched their ideological
leanings differently than the side opposite their ideological
leanings. Thus, does a conservative Justice engage in a
significantly different amount of information seeking with a
conservative party in a case than with a liberal party, and
vice versa? To measure the partisan direction of a side in a
case, this study used a measure from Spaeth's U.S. Supreme
165. Each Justice's annual Martin-Quinn score is created from that Justice's
voting patterns for the year. Thus, using a Justice's score for the 2007 term to
predict how he or she would vote in 2007 is circuitous in that the independent
variable (score) predicting the dependent variable (voting) is not truly
independent as it is caused by voting. Thus, there is both forward causality
(scores predict voting) and reverse causality (voting causes scores), and more
complicated statistical methods would be necessary to separate out the distinct
effects each variable is having on the other. By lagging the Martin-Quinn
scores (i.e., using 2006 scores to predict 2007 voting) reverse causality is no
longer an issue.
166. Martin-Quinn scores theoretically range from negative infinity to
positive infinity. The negative/positive aspect of a score measures the direction
of a Justice's ideology, with negative indicating liberal leanings and positive
scores representing conservative orientations. Likewise, a Justice could be
slightly liberal (a negative score close to zero) or extremely liberal (a larger
negative score further from zero). Hence, Martin-Quinn scores measure both
the direction (negative/liberal or positive/conservative) and the intensity (larger
number/more partisan or smaller number/less partisan) of ideology. By taking
the absolute value of a Martin-Quinn score direction is no longer measured as it
is impossible to know whether the score is in the liberal/negative or
conservative/positive direction. Therefore, only intensity (how partisan) of
ideology is being measured.
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Court judicial database with regard to the direction of the
ruling of a case in the lower court. 167 Then, an ideology match
variable was created wherein if the partisan direction of a
side in a case equaled the ideology dummy variable of a
Justice, the variable was coded a "0," and if there was no
match it was coded a "1." This leads to two hypotheses to test
the strategic model:
H2a: Ideology should be a statistically significant
predictor of information seeking during oral argument.
H2b: Ideology match should be a statistically significant
predictor of information seeking during oral argument.
The attitudinal model would contend that information
seeking would only occur during oral argument in order to
allow the Justice to determine which side matches his or her
ideological preference. Thus, Justices, if they already knew
which side they wanted to support, would have no need to
engage in information seeking during oral argument. Thus:
H3: Justices driven purely by ideological considerations
will consistently not verbally engage attorneys during oral
argument.
To control for the fact that oral argument behavior may
merely be due to Justice-specific factors, 168 and, therefore, to
test the behavioralist model, three more variables were
created. Conceivably, since Justices that are more qualified
to sit on the bench may behave differently during oral
argument than less qualified peers, this study used
qualification scores obtained from Segal and Cover, 1 69 in
which each Justice receives a score ranging from 0.000
(unqualified) to 1.000 (completely qualified). Scores for this
study ranged from 0.125 for Justice Clark to 1.000 for
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, Brennan, Fortas, and
Stewart. Because Justices who have served longer on the
court may act differently from newer Justices in oral
argument, a variable for experience was created with the
value being the number of years on the U.S. Supreme Court
("1V for first year, for example). Because "Justice Breyer's
167. The Judicial Research Initiative (JuRI): U.S. Supreme Court Databases,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
168. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 73; Grossman, supra note 35.
169. Segal & Cover, supra note 18; Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of
Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2005, http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/
qualtable.pdf.
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questions remind some observers that he was formerly a law
professor," 1 0 and because the argument has been made that
Justices use the Socratic method during oral argument,
treating attorneys like law students,17 a dummy variable was
created for law professor experience with a "1" indicating the
Justice had taught law at some point prior to coming to the
the
"0"
indicating
a
and
bench
absence of professorial experience. This leads to three final
hypotheses in the first part of the study:
H4a: Justices' qualification levels should be a statistically
significant predictor of oral argument behavior.
H4b: Justices' time serving in the Supreme Court should
be a statistically significant predictor of oral argument
behavior.
H4c: Justices' experience as a law professor should be a
statistically significant predictor of oral argument
behavior.
The following conceptual model illustrates the hypotheses
being examined in the first part of this study:
LEGAL MODEL
(attorney experience, solicitor
general attorney, amicus
attorney, case side)
ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(no verbal engagement)
STRATEGIC MODEL
(ideology, ideology match)

':-==
,::.

ORAL ARGUMENT
BEHAVIOR
(information-seeking scale,
word count)

BEHAVIORALIST MODEL
(qualification level, Court
experience, law professor
experience)
Figure 2. Potential influencers of oral argument behavior.

The second part of this study's analysis argues that oral
argument behavior will predict how Justices vote, with the
information-seeking score and word count as the two

170. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 35, at 73.

171. Symposium, supra note 78.
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independent variables and whether or not a Justice voted for
a side as a dummy dependent variable ("1" indicates voter for,
"0" indicates voted against).
This leads to two final
hypotheses:
H5a: The information-seeking score for Justices for a
particular side in a case will be a statistically significant
predictor of the Justices' support for that side.
H5b: The number of words spoken by Justices to a
particular side in a case will be a statistically significant
predictor of Justices' support for that side.
Finally, the third part of this study's analysis will
examine whether Justices behave differently in oral
argument in the 2000s versus the 1960s. While scholars have
lamented the polarization of the American electorate 172 and
elected political elites,1 73 it is likely that nominated political
elites have likewise grown more partisan given they hail from
one or both of these two groups. This would be reflected in
the degree to which Justices seek information during oral
argument. If there is a statistically significant difference
between information seeking from Justices in the 1960s as
compared to the 2000s, initial evidence would exist for the
argument that the Court has grown more partisan, leading to
the following hypotheses:
H6a: The information-seeking score for Justices in the
2000s will be higher (meaning less information seeking) in
a statistically significant manner when compared to the
information-seeking score for Justices in the 1960s.
H6b: The word counts for Justices in the 2000s will be
higher in a statistically significant manner when
compared to the word counts for Justices in the 1960s.
IV. EXPLAINING CASE SELECTION AND MEASUREMENT
Because ideology is an important factor in this study, and
because scholars have found that issue salience triggers
ideology with less salient issues reducing the impact of
ideology,174 only cases regarding the freedoms of speech and
172. Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71
J. OF POL. 1 (2009).
173. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006).

174. Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue
Salience: When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?,
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the press were selected in order to optimize the role ideology
might be playing in judicial behavior. In order to analyze
data at the Justice level, only two time periods could be
studied: 1963-1965 and 2004-present. Outside of those two
time periods, oral argument transcripts do not delineate
which Justice is speaking. A total of twenty-three cases
relating to speech and press freedoms were found from 20042008 based on a search of thefirstamendmentcenter.org, and
the transcripts were obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court's
website (www.supremecourt.gov). Additionally, twelve cases
relating to the freedoms of speech and press were obtained
from the Supreme Court's library in Washington, D.C. by the
second author (see Appendix II for a full list of cases included
in this study).
The first author trained one other coder and then each
separately coded three cases from the 2004-2008 selections
(or thirteen percent of the cases). Intercoder reliability was
measured using Krippendorff's alpha17 5 and was high at 0.93.
The first author then coded the remaining twenty modern
cases alone. For the twelve cases from the 1960s, two coders
were trained by the first author. They coded two of the same
cases, achieving an intercoder reliability of 0.96. They then
both coded alone five cases each. Coders were instructed that
in instances where it was not clear which of two categories a
sentence could be placed in, the category lower on the scale
(meaning higher information seeking) was to be chosen. Each
sentence was coded in the selected cases, resulting in a total
of 2138 sentences being coded from the 1960s cases and 5512
sentences being coded from the 2000s cases (7600 sentences
overall). A separate observation was created for each Justice
for each side he or she verbally engaged during oral argument
by averaging the sentence type score for each sentence

41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 259 (2007).
175. Andrew F. Hayes & Klaus Krippendorff, Answering the Call for a
StandardReliability Measure for Coding Data, 1 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES
77 (2007); Klaus Krippendorff, Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common
Misconceptions and Recommendations, 30 HUM. COMM. RES. 411 (2004).
Krippendorffs alpha can be used to measure the intercoder reliability of
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio-level data, and corrects some of the
deficiencies of other well-known measures: percent agreement, Scott's pi,
Cohen's kappa, Pearson's r, and Holsti's cr; Krippendorfs alpha was measured
in SPSS 16.0 using a macro that can be found at http://www.comm.ohiostate.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/kalpha.htm.
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uttered to that side in a case and summing the number of
words spoken to that side.
V. CAUSES OF INFORMATION SEEKING & PREDICTING THE

VOTES OF JUSTICES
As this study employs mixed methods--qualitative and
quantitative analysis-this part of the article will first
examine the oral arguments qualitatively by presenting
examples of how Justices use statements and questions
Then this part will turn to a
during oral arguments.
quantitative examination of information-seeking levels
during oral argument, investigating what is driving
information seeking and how information seeking may
forecast a Justice's eventual vote on the merits.
A. Excerpts from OralArgument Transcripts
A reading of Supreme Court oral argument transcripts
soon destroys any notion one might have possessed of the
black-and-white boundaries of questions and statements.
Justices blur the line between questions and declarations,
sometimes even within the same remark, as Justice Ginsburg
did in the following excerpt:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So if that is the rationale that the
district court went on, can this Court possibly uphold it
when there is nobody, as far as we know-they haven't
even come into this case at this level, filing a friend of the
Court brief.
176
ATTORNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
Statements at times served a quasi-information-seeking role
by being used by the Justices to set up questions:
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S.
at
[hereinafter
Clingman],
available
581
(2005)
(No.
04-37)

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/0437.pdf. The state of Oklahoma changed its laws regarding primaries, allowing
only members of a particular party and Independents to vote in that party's
primary election. Id. at 3. The Libertarian Party and some voters challenged
the laws on the grounds of a First Amendment violation of the freedoms of
expression and association in that Libertarian Party could not allow voters from
other parties to participate in its primary elections. Id. at 42-43. Here Justice
Ginsburg is pointing out to the petitioner's attorney that the District Court
rejected all of the arguments of the Libertarian Party except for one-that the
law is damaging to major parties-but no major party has complained about
that in the litigation. Id. at 8.
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JUSTICE GINSBURG: You-you did draft this injunction.
It wasn't the-an inspiration from the judge unaided by
your advocacy. Is that so?...

And, understandably, declarations are a necessary part of
presenting a hypothetical situation that ends in a question:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: That is, suppose the inmate's
position is I want to go there and I want to read Law Week
and Legal Times and other-I want to see what's new,
what's breaking in the law so that maybe I'll have
something I can put in a petition, and that's why I want to
go every-every chance I get17 to
the law library. Could such
8
an inmate go to the library?

Frequently Justices use statements to indirectly seek
information in the way of provoking an attorney's response,
as did Justice Breyer in this exchange:
JUSTICE BREYER: But I don't see how you can have a
constitutional rule that would forbid-allow you to open
and drain, but wouldn't allow the Dems to do the same as
they've done in Alaska.
ATTORNEY: I think in-in Alaska, of course, right now
there is a party option where all the
parties but the
179
Republicans have opened the primary.

177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S.
734
(2005)
(No.
03-1488)
[hereinafter
Tory],
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/031488.pdf. Cochran sued a former client, Tory, as Tory was defaming Cochran
and demanding money in order to stop. See id. at 11. A judge ordered Tory to
not talk about Cochran again, wherein Tory appealed, arguing his First
Amendment right to free speech was being violated. Id. at 6. Here Justice
Ginsburg is addressing the fact that Cochran's attorney helped the original
judge write the injunction against Tory. Id. at 35.
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S.
521
(2006)
(No.
04-1739)
[hereinafter
Beard],
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus. gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/041739.pdf. Banks, a prisoner in Pennsylvania, sued Beard, the Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, because he had been placed in the
highest security of detention possible due to his inability to cooperate, and had
been subsequently denied access to most newspapers and magazines, which
Banks argued was a violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 3, 32. Here
Justice Ginsburg is responding to a statement by Beard's attorney that it is a
tremendous burden to allow an inmate to go to the mini law library in the
prison because of the personnel and security requirements to move a prisoner.
Id. at 10.
179. Clingman, supra note 176, at 27. The respondent has argued via briefs
that the Constitution requires states adopting party primary rules similar to
those in place in Alaska, wherein parties can open up their primaries to
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Other times Justices state their desire for more information
from an attorney:
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, I just want to know whatATTORNEY: -than Social Security.
JUSTICE SOUTER: -your position is. I just want to
know what your position is.
ATTORNEY: My position is that..."s0
Such statements can often be direct requests, as the following
example from Justice Kennedy illustrates:
JUSTICE
KENNEDY:
I'm
asking
what
your
recommendation
is to what our rule should be in this
18 1
case.

The Justices themselves seem to understand that just
because there is not a question mark at the end of a sentence,
does not mean that the sentence was not a question, as can be
seen from the following exchange between Justice Kennedy
and an attorney where Kennedy never directly asks a
question, but demands the attorney answer his question
anyway, with the attorney then trying to clarify what the
question might have been:

participation from other parties. Id. at 26.
180. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Veneman v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n, 543 U.S. 977 (2004) (No. 03-1164) [hereinafter Veneman], available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/031164.pdf. Federal law required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic pro-beef
advertising overseen by the government. Id. at 4-6, 35. Some cattle producers
did not agree with the message of the advertisements and sued the Department
of Agriculture, arguing that being forced to fund advertising they did not agree
with violated their First Amendment speech rights. See id. at 5-7, 17. Justice
Souter had proposed a hypothetical question to the respondent regarding a
similar situation to the case, but with an excise tax instead, and wanted to
know if the respondent thought the hypothetical situation created a First
Amendment problem. Id. at 55.
181. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393
(2007)
(No.
06-278)
[hereinafter
Morse],
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06278.pdf. Frederick, a student, held up a banner at a school-supervised event
that read "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang term for marijuana usage. Id. at 4, 17.
The principal, Morse, took the banner away and suspended Frederick from
school for violating the school's policy prohibiting the display of material
promoting the use of illegal drugs. See id. at 18-20, 46. Frederick sued Morse,
alleging his First Amendment right to freedom of speech was infringed. See id.
at 29-30. The attorney from the solicitor general's office supporting the
petitioner had just stated the narrow rationale for why the Court should rule in
Morse's favor when Justice Kennedy spoke. See id. at 19-20.
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: So, in this caseATTORNEY: -is permissible.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: -I take it, it would be okay if the
beef producers had to use a dollar a head to put, "Eating
too much beef is dangerous to your health."
ATTORNEY: Well, if they had-well, they're not beef
producers. I mean, I am troubled by-they're--these are
cattle.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: All right, cattle, thenATTORNEY: All right?
And then-and then they're
trying, ultimately, to brand us as though we are slicing
these things up and selling them.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But what's the answer to my
question?
ATTORNEY: If the question is, can retail grocers be
2
required to put on the beef packages they sell ....

For the most part, though, attorneys appear to understand
the way Justices sometimes want answers to statements, as
shown in the example below where an attorney was
addressed by Justice Alito after her time had run out:
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, for that reason, they're-for that
reason, they're not likely to-in most instances, they
would not be hostile to receiving that kind of information,
if it was provided to them.
ATTORNEY: May I answer?
83
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure.1

182. Veneman, supra note 180, at 52-53. Justice Kennedy is trying to see if

the respondent's attorney thinks it would be permissible to tax the beef
producers in order to put a government-sponsored message on beef packages
warning consumers of the potentially adverse effects of beef consumption,
similar to the way cigarette manufacturers must warn consumers about the
danger of using their product. Id.
183. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006) (No. 04-473), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/04-473b.pdf. An employee of the Los
Angeles District Attorney's office, Ceballos, found evidence that law
enforcement had lied in a search warrant affidavit, wherein Ceballos informed
prosecuting attorneys of the situation, but the District Attorney's office decided
to prosecute anyway. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. Ceballos then informed the
defendant's attorneys of the potentially invalid affidavit and was subpoenaed to
testify by defense attorneys, leading to retaliation against Ceballos by D.A.
attorneys. Id. Ceballos sued, arguing that his cooperation with the defense was
protected by the First Amendment. Id. Here Justice Alito is responding to the
respondent's argument that if would be harmful to government attorneys if
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Maybe the most humorous example of the ambivalence
attorneys face over whether or not a Justice just asked a
question or made a statement is found in this reply to Justice
Scalia:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Why would it lessen? I assume
whatever you put in an appendix, saying all these other
situations that are not before us are not covered. Isn't
that the most blatant dictum? But-but-and, of course,
we're not bound in later cases by our dicta. But come to
think of it, I guess the whole doctrine of overbreadth rests
upon dictum, doesn't it?
It-it rests upon our
determination in this case, which involves somebody who
undoubtedly was selling child porn, and a horrible kind of
child porn-we say in this case, how, we can-we can
contemplate other cases, where we would not hold the
person guilty. This is all dictum, too, isn't it? So I guess
the whole doctrine is-is based on dictum. So we may as
well put it in all an appendix. Let's put our dictum in an
appendix. I agree.
ATTORNEY: In answer to Your Honor's question or
comment ....

184

If statements can act as questions, however, questions are not
always very high in information-seeking value, such as the
following rhetorical question:
ATTORNEY: Yes, as it turns out, because in 2006 we ran
the same sort of anti-filibuster ads and Senator Kohl, now
up for reelection, changed his position on the filibuster. So
these things happen. In other words, people-people's
positions are affected by grassroots lobbying, and at least
people should have the opportunity to engage in
grassroots lobbying.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that called democracy?

employees in their office were afraid to come forward to tell them of information
potentially damaging the attorney's case. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 183, at 60.
184. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, United States v. Williams, 128 S.
Ct. 1830 (2008) (No. 06-694), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument -transcripts/06-694.pdf. Williams was convicted of
promoting child pornography under federal law and sued, arguing that the law
was overbroad and restricted his First Amendment right of free speech. See id.
at 14, 29. Justice Scalia is here reacting to the respondent's claim that if the
Court provided an appendix listing what materials are considered child
pornography, the problem of overbreadth would be lessened. Id.
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ATTORNEY: We are hopeful, Your Honor." 5

Another type of question employed by Justices that has very
little information-seeking value is the leading question,
particularly when it appears to also simultaneously attack
the attorney's position:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you think it was clearly
established that she had to allow a student at a schoolsupervised function to
hold a [fifteen]-foot banner saying
86
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus"?1

In the following questioning, Justice Scalia, by shifting from
the word "reasonable" to "remotely," turns what appears to be
a bipolar question in the first instance to a leading or
rhetorical question in the second instance:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you think that it-it is a
reasonable description of what happened-he was fired for
complaining about his girls' team not getting enough
facilities-that he was, on the basis of sex, excluded from
participation in, denied benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination under an education program?
MR. DELLINGER: Absolutely.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you think that-that remotely
describes what happened to this coach?
MR. DELLINGER: Absolutely.187

185. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (No.
06-969)
[hereinafter FEC], available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06969.pdf. A nonprofit group, Wisconsin Right to Life, ran television ads
encouraging Wisconsin voters to contact their U.S. senators and urge the
senators to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. FEC, 127 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
The group was unable to continue running the ads sixty days prior to the 2004
election because federal law prohibited it, which, the group argued, was a
violation of their First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 2661. At this
point in oral argument, Justice Stevens had just questioned the sincerity of the
petitioner's motives in running the ads, attempting to establish that it was not a
realistic goal that the ads would actually change the targeted senator's mind on
the issue, but instead the ads were discretely trying to encourage voters to not
re-elect the senator. FEC, supra note 185, at 42.
186. Morse, supra note 181, at 30-31. The respondent had just argued that
existing law clearly showed that the principal could not censor the student's
speech. Id.
187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,
544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672) [hereinafter Jackson], available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/021672.pdf. A high school girls' basketball coach, Jackson, sued the Birmingham
Board of Education because he claimed he was fired for complaining that his
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And, as also just shown above, some Justices have a tendency
to ask the same question in a few different forms, meaning
that what at first glance may look like two or three different
questions, is in reality only one:
JUSTICE ALITO: What's the difference between that?
ATTORNEY: The money is being usedJUSTICE ALITO: What's the difference between saying
would you like to make a contribution, and would you like
to allow us to use money that we possess for our purposes
rather than returning
it to us? What's the difference
188
between those two?

After reading oral argument transcripts one soon comes to
the conclusion that often Justices ask questions to which they
already know the answer. In the following exchange Justice
Souter asks a question, but does not get the answer he
wanted, so he goes on to propose his own answer:
JUSTICE SOUTER: What's theATTORNEY: Deception is the-my constitutional
argument.
JUSTICE SOUTER: -what's the difference between the
checkoff and the excise tax?
ATTORNEY: Well, the checkoff in this case is money that
goes to a group, which, though it is organized by the
government, purports to representJUSTICE SOUTER: So the answer isATTORNEY: -the way it structuredJUSTICE SOUTER: -where-

team was not receiving equal treatment from the school and that his dismissal
violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Jackson, 544 U.S. at
167. At this point in oral argument the petitioner has just argued that the
coach was discriminated against on the basis of sex since he coached a girls'
team. Jackson, supra note 187, at 7.
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551
U.S. 177 (2007) (No. 05-1589) [hereinafter Davenport] available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/051589.pdf.
Davenport, a non-union teacher, sued the teachers union,
Washington Education Association, because it collected fees from him and then
used them for political purposes that he did not agree with, which, he argued,
was a violation of his First Amendment rights. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 183.
The respondent had just finished trying to argue that it is different for a union
to ask for a contribution versus asking a potential non-union donator if using
the donator's money for a particular purpose is acceptable. Davenport, supra
note 188, at 41.
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ATTORNEY: -these people.
JUSTICE SOUTER: -where the money goes and who
pays out the money for the ad, that's the difference.
ATTORNEY: Well, the difference is the whole structure.
Keep in mindJUSTICE SOUTER: Well, isn't that the-isn't that the
essential difference between the structure in this case and
the structure in the case in which the government comes
out, saying, "This is your government, saying, 'Don't
smoke."'
ATTORNEY: Yes, one-the difference is that in one case,
we've got Congress, we've got the executive, we have one189
JUSTICE SOUTER: Right.

Often Justices will answer their own questions, as illustrated
in the two examples below:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, how far away is the
furthest county seat for somebody in the country?
ATTORNEY: I don't know theCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: County seats aren't very far
for people in Indiana.
ATTORNEY: No .... 190
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What did he have to do to
become on the ballot for delegate?
ATTORNEY: If he wanted to be a single person runningappearing as a gadflyCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 500 signatures, right?19 1

189. Veneman, supra note 180, at 46-47. The Justices have been trying to
determine whether adding a tag to an advertisement alerting the viewer that
the ad was funded by the government would be permissible in the respondent's
view when this exchange occurs. Id. at 46.
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (No. 07-21) [hereinafter Crawford], available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/0721.pdf. The state of Indiana passed a law that required voters to present photo
identification when voting in person. Id. at 4. The law was challenged by the
local Democratic Party as placing an undue burden on the right to vote,
particularly for minorities and the elderly. Id. at 4-5, 48-49. At this point in
oral argument the respondent has been arguing that the requirement that
voters who forget their ID have to go to the county seat to cast their vote is
overly burdensome. Id. at 16.
191. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torrez, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008) (No. 06-766) [hereinafter New York], available at
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Attorneys, maybe sensing this, even sometimes ask Justices
to answer their own questions:
JUSTICE STEVENS: Would it also prohibit you from
using-urging everyone to look to a website that used the
same magic words?
ATTORNEY: Would it?
192
JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes.
The Court publishes a guide for attorneys, including the
proper way to answer questions during oral argument. It
states: "Expect questions from the Court, and make every
effort to answer the questions directly. If at all possible, say
'yes' or 'no,' and then expand upon your answer if you
'
wish."193
In the following exchange the attorney, while
understanding correct protocol, wishes to diverge from it, to
Justice Souter's chagrin:
JUSTICE SOUTER: And if-if there is no efficacy and
there is an infringement of what, at least for people on the
outside, would be a protected right, then they have no
justification for taking those rights away. And if that's
going to be the analysis, then on-on the argument you
just gave, they've got to give the TV rights back, they've
got to give the magazine rights back, and so on. Isn't that
correct?
ATTORNEY: May I answer it this way? I know I'm
supposed to say yes or no and then(Laughter.)
ATTORNEY: -to give an explanation.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06766.pdf. Lopez, a candidate for a trial court judgeship in New York state,
claimed that the state's system of using party-elected delegates to vote for trial
court judges unfairly prevented candidates who did not receive a party's

backing from becoming a trial court judge, thus violating the First Amendment
right to the freedom of association of both voters and candidates. N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections, 128 S. Ct. at 797. Previous to this encounter in oral argument,
Chief Justice Roberts had been attempting to determine what burdens the
respondent were arguing existed, including how difficult it was to become a
delegate in order to be able to vote in the trial court judge elections. New York,
supra note 191, at 44.
192. FEC, supra note 185, at 53. Justice Stevens had just asked the
respondent if the Constitution allows Congress to prohibit election ads from
using certain words, to which the respondent had replied that it did. Id.
193. CLERK OF THE COURT, GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (2008),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf.
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ATTORNEY: I'll say no. My instinct is no, and I would
also say theJUSTICE SOUTER: But then why? Why? 94

Some Justices are not averse to jumping in and helping an
attorney when he or she is struggling, either with a line of
reasoning or with another Justice's questioning. In the
example below Justice Scalia, like the law professor he once
was, leads the attorney along, metaphorically holding the
attorney's hand as they traverse through a point:
JUSTICE SCALIA: To apply an opinion of this Court to
particular circumstances, and find that in the view of the
court of appeals, it produces a certain result is not
necessarily to say that that is clearly established Supreme
Court law. It just means that is their best guess as to how
it comes out, right?
ATTORNEY: That's correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, they're forced to decide it one
way or the other, the Supreme Court opinion either means
this or that. They're not applying a clearly established
test to the Supreme Court, are they?
ATTORNEY: Not by doing that ..... 9

Justice Ginsburg, also a former law professor, takes a similar
tact with an attorney, in this case the solicitor general of the
United States, with Justice Scalia jumping in as well:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is it relevant, General Clement,
that the legislature didn't seem to be, or the ballot
194. Beard, supra note 178, at 33. The respondent had been arguing with
Chief Justice Roberts that because the First Amendment right deprivation of
withholding newspaper and magazine reading was ineffective in rectifying an
inmate's recalcitrant behavior, the justification for infringing those rights was
not warranted and the policy should stop, to which Justice Souter sought to
take the attorney's argument to the next logical step. Id. at 32-33.
195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006)
(No. 05-785) [hereinafter Carey], available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/05-785.pdf.
Musladin was convicted of
murder and at his trial the victim's family wore buttons displaying pictures of
the victim. Carey, 549 U.S. at 72. Musladin appealed his conviction under the
argument that his Due Process right to a fair trial had been compromised
because the buttons had prejudiced the jury. Id. at 73. Prior to this exchange,
the petitioner had been arguing that the Circuit Court of Appeals had
misapplied Supreme Court precedence, giving a very narrow interpretation to
the issue of what may cause a prejudiced trial. Carey, supra note 195, at 5.
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initiative didn't seem to be focused at all on beefing up the
rights of the non-member of the union? It seemed to be
concerned with the integrity of the election process,
because they left the same old Hudson in place for union
non-germane spending that didn't have to do with
elections.
ATTORNEY: That's absolutely right, Justice Ginsburg,
and I think the way we look at it is that this whole debate
about the purpose of the provision is a little bit of a red
herring, because at the end of the day it's clearly a hybrid.
If you look at the text, it's hard to understand how it does
not have at least the effect of protecting workers. On the
other hand, you're absolutely right that it doesn't address
the entirety of germane, of non-germane expenses. It
addressed a subset that have the most direct impact on
the election process.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Or even non-germane political
expenses.
ATTORNEY: That's true. That's true, I mean, for example
196

Justices may use a series of low-information-seeking
questions, such as leading or rhetorical questions, to make a
point to help an attorney:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Are we-are we talking wealthy
people here? What's the average price of a home in the
United States? I think it's a good deal above $350,000,
isn't it?
ATTORNEY: It certainly is in this area and in many
congressional districts in the United States. And that's a
very good point, Justice Scalia.' 97
196. Davenport, supra note 188, at 20-21.

The solicitor general had been

pointing out to the Court that the union made it much easier for non-members
to opt in to paying dues then to opt out, and was bringing up the point that the
difficulty of opting out may infringe on the constitutional right of being able to
opt out of union due payment. Id. at 20.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct.
at
available
Davis],
07-320)
[hereinafter
(2008)
(No.
2759
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/07320.pdf. Davis, a millionaire candidate for U.S. Congress in New York, argued
that federal law that allows opponents of millionaire candidates to raise more
from individuals and organizations then under normal circumstances was a
violoation of the millionaire candidate's First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment rights. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2767, 2775 n.9. The petitioner had
been stating just prior to this exchange that in an election opponents to
millionaire candidates may try and make an argument to voters that the

130

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

A Justice may also help an attorney by trying to steer the
conversation away from an unhelpful avenue of discussion, as
seen in the two examples below:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Then why are we arguing about
whether there is one half of one percent of the electorate
who may be adversely affected and as to whom it might be
unconstitutional? That one half of one percent, if and
when it is sought to be applied to them, have a cause of
action to say you can't apply it to me. But why-what
precedent is there for knocking down this entire law on a
facial challenge when I think everybody agrees that in the
vast majority of cases it doesn't impose a significant
hardship?
ATTORNEY: None. I think that that's 19
exactly
the point.
8
That's why we argue there's no standing.
JUSTICE SCALIA: So you want to get away from a
hypothetical then. I don't know why you try to defend a
hypothetical that involves a banner that says amend the
marijuana laws. That's not this case as you see it, is it?
ATTORNEY: Well, it certainly not this case, butJUSTICE SCALIA: This banner was interpreted as
meaning smoke pot, no?
99
ATTORNEY: It was interpreted-exactly, yes.'
And, blatantly, Justices occasionally jump in to help an
attorney know how best to answer a difficult question, or
when to agree with an adversarial Justice, as happened twice
in the following case's oral arguments:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Sure. You're saying this is an
applied challenge which is different in some relevant
respects, so that the facial holding in McConnell shouldn't
apply to us, it shouldn't bar, shouldn't justify the
Government barring our ad. Isn't that your logic?
wealthy candidate is out of touch and not representative of the people in the
congressional district. Davis, supra note 197, at 16.
198. Crawford, supra note 190, at 35. The respondent had just agreed with
Justice Scalia that a facial challenge may not be appropriate in the case because
there was only a small minority of the population that might be affected by the
law. Id.
199. Morse, supra note 181, at 8. Previous to this point in the oral argument
Justice Souter had proposed a hypothetical to the petitioner in which the
student's banner had instead been advocating the amendment of current drug
usage laws regarding marijuana. Id. at 7.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: You could say yes to that, I think.
20 0
ATTORNEY: Thank you.
JUSTICE SOUTER: The way to do that is say, there's
something different about my case from the case which
was taken as typical in upholding statute against facial
challenge.
JUSTICE SCALIA: He fears the Greeks even when they
bear gifts.
(Laughter.)
ATTORNEY: Yes, we have.20 1
As can be seen from some of the examples above, humor is
often a part of oral argument, and Hobbs, after her study of
oral arguments, argued that "humor can be a potent weapon
in an attorney's arsenal,"2 2 though the Supreme Court guide
for attorneys cautions that "attempts at humor usually fall
flat."" 3 Understandably, then, it is the Justices, particularly
Justice Scalia, who inject most of the levity into oral
argument, often with what appear to be strategic motivations.
In the example below Justice Scalia uses humor to neutralize
Justice Souter's attempt at a point at the expense of the
attorney:
JUSTICE SOUTER: So-so but at some point, there's sort
of a reasonableness limit then you're saying.
ATTORNEY: There is a reasonableness limit, and we'vewe'veJUSTICE SCALIA: Do-do you concede that just because
a right is enumerated, it means it cannot be entirely taken
away in prison?
ATTORNEY: No. This CourtJUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, like, you know, try the right to
200. FEC, supra note 185, at 48. Justice Souter had been just arguing with
the respondent that the respondent was trying to put on the Government the
burden of satisfying strict scrutiny in order to avoid the holding in a previous
FEC-related case. See id.
201. Id. at 49. Justice Souter had just been claiming that the respondent's
first step in advancing their argument was that this case was significantly
different then previous cases which provide the precedent for determining the
case. Id.
202. Pamela Hobbs, Lawyers' Use of Humor as Persuasion,20 HUMOR: INT'L
J. OF HUMOR RES. 123, 123 (2007).
203. CLERK OF THE COURT, supra note 193, at 11.
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bear arms.
(Laugher.)
This Court
ATTORNEY: That's right. No. I mean-no.
20 4
has drawn-has drawn that distinction.
Generally, though, humor is used by the Justices to
undermine attorneys, at times interrupting an attorney with
a seemingly irrelevant humorous comment:
ATTORNEY: But I don't think it needs to be because of
the pattern and practice that this man has engaged in
over [three] years. And if we take the example, which is
so he has a change of heart and suddenly he now wants to
praise Mr. Cochran and that's become his-and he's going
to promote him as mayor of San Francisco, he can
certainly go into the court and modify the injunction.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: I thought he lived in L.A.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: I think he'd like to get him up to San
Francisco. (Laughter. )205
More frequently, Justices will use humor to make a point,
causing an attorney's argument to appear foolish, as seen in
the examples below:
JUSTICE SCALIA: You think that's really a proper
function of government, to look out over there and say,
we're going to even the playing field in this election?
What if some-one candidate is more eloquent than the
other one? You make20 6him talk with pebbles in his mouth
or what? (Laughter.)

JUSTICE KENNEDY: So under your view, if the principal
204. Beard, supra note 178, at 21. An attorney from the solicitor general's
office arguing for the petitioner had just stated that there can be an

exaggerated response wherein First Amendment rights are curtailed for a
minor offence. Id.
205. Tory, supra note 177, at 38. The respondent had been arguing that the
injunction against the petitioner did not need to be narrowly tailored because of
the unique aspects of the case wherein the petitioner was using speech to
engage in activity unprotected by the First Amendment, namely extortion. Id.
at 37.
206. Davis, supra note 197, at 27. Justice Alito had just questioned the
respondent on Congress's ability to set different contribution limits for
challengers and respondents, and the respondent, the U.S. solicitor general, had
responded that he thought it was perfectly appropriate for Congress to do such.
Id.
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sees something wrong in the crowd across the street, had
to come up and say now, how many here are truants and
how many here are-I can't discipline you because you're
a truant, you can go ahead and throw the bottle.
(Laughter.)
ATTORNEY: No, I don't think she needs to do that in the
heat of the moment. But later on once she's discovered the
true facts, then at that point I think she loses a basis for
punishing him as a student if he was not there as a
student.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Because you're both a truant and
disrupter, you get off.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: Had you been just a disrupter, tough
luck.2 °7
Most commonly Justices use oral argument to try and control
attorneys, pushing them toward certain conclusions or
concessions that the Justices desire. At times the Justices
appear to be engaging in a form of verbal bullying, as in the
following parley between Justice Scalia and his old Harvard
law classmate and longtime ideological nemesis, Larry Tribe
(who, incidentally, is one of the few attorneys with the
chutzpah to violate the guidelines recommended by the
Court 2°8 by frequently interrupting Justices, possibly due to a
combination of his experience before the Court, standing in
the legal community, and personality):
JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay, so it isMR. TRIBE: But being the governmentJUSTICE SCALIA: -it is not essentialMR. TRIBE: It may be.
JUSTICE SCALIA: -that
the government might-in
order to be government speech, the government does not
have to identify itself as the speaker.
MR. TRIBE: I207. Morse, supra note 181, at 52-53. The respondent had just been
attempting to make a point with several of the Justices that the student in the
case had not been in the custody of the school because he had yet to come to
school and that after the assembly where the infraction took place he went to
school because the principal had ordered him to. Id. at 52.
208. "Never interrupt a Justice who is addressing you. .

.

. If you are

speaking and a Justice interrupts you, cease talking immediately." CLERK OF
THE COURT, supra note 193, at 10.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes or no? Yes or no?
MR. TRIBE: I think the answer is yes .... 209
Here is another example of a Justice pushing an attorney
towards a particular response:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Do you have to depend on there being
a message? Isn't it enough if there is an influence that is
conveyed? I mean, what I thought the problem was, was
that there was as a result of the obtrusive wearing of the
button, that it created a risk simply of an emotional
approach to the determination of guilt or innocence. The
jurors are more likely to feel sorry for the family members
sitting there a few feet away from them. Perhaps they
may be more likely to feel sorry for the victim, but
certainly for the family members. And it would be that
improper influence of emotionalism as opposed to a
particular message that is the problem here, isn't it?
ATTORNEY: I don't disagree with that.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Do you accept that?
ATTORNEY: I do accept that, and I don't need to rely on a
message. I would agree with the argument that you've
advanced.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay.21 °
Or, even more aggressively, Justice Souter seeks concession
on a point:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Salerno says unless there are no
cases, the facial challenge is inappropriate. And that-in
the real world that will never be true with respect to a-a
voter ID law, will it?
ATTORNEY: Well, I hope not. But I think that the Court
has shownJUSTICE SOUTER: It never will be true, will it?
211
ATTORNEY: Right.

209. Veneman, supra note 180, at 32-33. Justice Scalia had just re-stated
the respondent's comments that he would address whether or not in Supreme
Court precedent the government has to identify it is speaking to be classified as
government speech, after which Justice Scalia followed with the example of Bob
Hope trying to sell war bonds in World War I; however, the respondent labeled
such an example a digression and indicated that his objection in the case was
unrelated to whether or not the government identified itself. Id. at 32.
210. Carey, supra note 195, at 45. The respondent had just claimed that the
risk with allowing buttons to be worn in the courtroom was than any number of
messages could be sent to the jury. Id. at 44.
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Such judicial aggression is not limited to just a quick
exchange or one point, particularly if the attorney is
resistant:
JUSTICE SOUTER: You mean the people in North
Carolina were unaware of the Edwards position, they were
unaware of the distinction between Faircloth and
Edwards?
ATTORNEY: I have no idea.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Of course they knew that.
ATTORNEH: I have no idea.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Of course they knew that. And just
as presumably, you knew the position of Senator Feingold
in these advertisements, and the people in the state knew
because of your other-because of your other public
statements.
ATTORNEY: Because of one or two press releases?
JUSTICE SOUTER: Why should those things be ignored?
ATTORNEY: There's absolutely no evidence that anyone
in Wisconsin knew his position on the filibuster.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You think they're dumb?
ATTORNEY: No.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You have a web site. You have a web
site that calls their attention, and you think nobody's
going to it?
ATTORNEY: But we can't run the ads, we can'tJUSTICE SOUTER: Nobody's paying attention to what
the Senator is doing?
ATTORNEY: If we can't run the ads, we can't draw
peoples [sic] attention to the web site.
JUSTICE SOUTER: You think the only source of
information
about
Senator
Feingold
is
your
advertisement?
ATTORNEY: No, but I don'tJUSTICE SOUTER: Then if your advertisement is not the
sole source of information, then why do you assume that
no one in Wisconsin knows what the senator has been

211. Crawford, supra note 190, at 36. Justice Souter had been trying to get
the respondent to concede that if the Salerno standard was used in the case that
a facial challenge to a registration requirement would be impossible, to which
the respondent disagreed. Id.
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doing when he votes.
ATTORNEY: Look, polls show that a majority of the
people don't even know who the Vice President of the
United States is.
So to suggest that they know a
particular positionJUSTICE SOUTER: So your position is that we ignore
context because no one-because
the voters aren't smart
212
enough to have a context?
If an attorney does not give a satisfactory response, a rebuke
is possible. In the dialogue below Chief Justice Roberts
criticizes an attorney's response to a question:
ATTORNEY: Well, my-my-I suppose my most
straightforward answer would be that the Jewish Forward
can burn as quickly as the New York Times, that the
Christian Science MonitorCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then now you're
giving-now you're making their situation worse because
they tried to make your client's situation better. I mean,
yes, they could-maybe they could prohibit religious
journals as well, but they-for various reasons, they
decided not to do that. Maybe they could have eliminated
legal materials as well, but again, they decided not to do
it. They take a more circumscribed approach. So I'm not
sure it's a very effective response to say, well, they let
religious materials in and that can be used as well.213
Sometimes a hapless attorney will invoke a barrage of
correction from the bench with multiple Justices joining the
fray:
ATTORNEY: And Storer says if you find that happens
rarely, while it's not conclusive, it's the-it's indicative
that there is a severe burden.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But Storer212. FEC, supra note 185, at 37-38. Justice Souter had been arguing that

context cannot be ignored regarding television advertisements, using the
example of some ads run in North Carolina dealing with then Senate candidate

John Edwards, and the respondent had replied with the argument that speech
should not be prohibited because of the anticipated meaning some viewers
might take away from an ad's message or timing. Id.
213. Beard, supra note 178, at 40. Justice Breyer had just finished asking

the respondent his take on the petitioner's argument that certain types of
literature were banned in maximum security because of the potential it could be
made into a weapon or burned, whereas other types of literature that were not
so easily formed into something that could cause harm were not banned. Id. at
39-40.
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Isn't that a general election
case?
JUSTICE
SCALIA: That's a general election case, isn't
it? 214
Likewise, at times Justices cannot wait, piling question on
top of question and statement on top of statement as they
almost fight over each other 15 to get at an attorney, as the
following long excerpt illustrates:
JUSTICE BREYER: It goes on frequently in an opinion. I
have been known to do that myself. And I say this court
over here says it's a da-da-da, and I say "sure isn't that."
Well, what is it?
JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that language came from one
of our opinions, didn't it? The branding language?
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That was quoting Holbrook and
Flynn.
ATTORNEY: That's correct, Justice Ginsburg. That's
right.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So you can't fault the court for just
saying it isn't that. Mr. Ott says it isn't that.
ATTORNEY: That's correct. But I believe that it is not
part of the test. It was that the branding language, as in
Justice Brennan's-in Justice Brennan's dissent was not
part of the text articulated byJUSTICE SCALIA: Repeated later in opinions for the
majority, I think.
ATTORNEY: That's correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: In later cases, so I meanATTORNEY: That's correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Don't just put it in Brennan's dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't understand your
point about the state court focusing on Norris. The
question under AEDPA is still whether or not it is an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

214. New York, supra note 191, at 29. The respondent had just turned to
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), arguing that the holdings in that case

were favorable to his position in this case. Id.
215. The

Supreme

Court's

published

guidelines

for

attorneys

notes:

"[O]rdinarily if two Justices start to speak at once, the junior Justice will
withdraw in deference to the senior." CLERK OF THE COURT, supra note 193, at
13.
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ATTORNEY: Well, in this instance, much has been said
about the opinion and the carefully written opinion of the
state court. But the portion of the opinion that focuses on
this issue is, as I said, roughly two pages in length and
deals almost entirely with Norris. Norris was the contrast
case for the court of appeals.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in here it-you agree that the
California court has as much authority to say what
Federal law is as the Ninth Circuit, right? They are on a
par. Ninth Circuit decisions in no way binds the Supreme
Court of California. Isn't that so?
ATTORNEY: That is correct.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that this state court of appeals
chose to be respectful to the Ninth Circuit to consider
what it had said, doesn't sound to me like a very strong
argument.
ATTORNEY: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I would respectfully
disagree ... 216
Or a Justice will pass judgment on an attorney's position:
JUSTICE SCALIA: But you want to limit expenditures,
even if it's the person's own money. No possibility of
corruption. You're saying, no, this is enough speech. We
don't want to hear any more from you. We, the State, will
tell you how 7much campaigning is enough.
That's
21
extraordinary.
Justices will sometimes admit that they are not so much
seeking information from an attorney as they are trying to
make a point, as the two following exchanges show:
JUSTICE STEVENS: So, theATTORNEY: -hypothetical.

216. Carey, supra note 195, 28-30. The respondent had just critiqued the
lower court's opinion, arguing that it had injected additional and false analysis
through referring to the branding of the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Id. at

28.
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230 (2006) (No. 04-1528), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument transcripts/04-1528.pdf. Randall, a state legislature

in Vermont, sued Sorrell, the state's attorney general, over Vermont's laws
regarding how much money a candidate could raise from individuals and groups
as well as spend, which Randall argued was an unconstitutional infringement of
his First Amendment right to free speech. See id. at 3-5. An attorney for the
respondent had just argued that Vermont's law was enacted in order to avoid a
candidate's dependence on big money donors because the more money that was
spent the more money a candidate would need. Id. at 52.
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JUSTICE STEVENS: -the point I'm trying to make is,
Does your agreement, that you can engage in speech by
posting banners or handing a note, apply to symbolic
speechATTORNEY: It couldJUSTICE STEVENS:
-the
218
symbolic speech?

kind of conduct that is

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That gets back to the point I
was trying to make earlier. He came here because it was
the school event, the school sponsored activity. He could
have gone anywhere along the route. He knew that it was
coming by the school, he knew that they were going to be,
the students were going to be released to see it. He went
to join9 up with the school even if he were truant that
21
day.
Though usually Justices will not acknowledge they are
making a point-they just make it:
JUSTICE SCALIA: That brings us back to the question I
asked earlier and I suggested in my answer to that I don't
think it's content discrimination of the sort that triggers
strict scrutiny when the government gives money for a
particular purpose only and not for other purposes, and I
also don't think it's content discrimination of the sort that
triggers strict scrutiny when the government allows a
private organization to use governmental power to exact
money from people for a particular purpose only. That's a
different ball game.22 °

218. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Rumsfeld v. Forum, 547 U.S.
47
(2006)
(No.
04-1152)
[hereinafter
Rumsfeld],
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/041152.pdf. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the
Solomon Amendment, which withholds federal funds from universities that that
limit U.S. military recruiters access to students more than other organizations;
the Forum argued that the law infringed upon a school's rights to expressive
association guaranteed under the First Amendment. Id. at 3. Justice Stevens
had been asking the petitioner about whether or not a hypothetical situation
where separate-but-equal recruiting venues had been set up for the military
would be acceptable. Id. at 22-23.
219. Morse, supra note 181, at 54. The respondent had just argued that the
situation in the case was similar to a situation where a student had gone on his
own to the zoo and a teacher from a school group there had disciplined the
student for something he was doing or saying. Id.
220. Davenport, supra note 188, at 44. The respondent had been arguing
prior to Justice Scalia's quote here that content discrimination does not allow
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Similarly, Justices are not afraid to tell attorneys what point
they should be making:
ATTORNEY: Yes, that is it's only in regard to influencing
elections or operating a political committee, which is a
second.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I thought that that was
content. You could do it, say, in the press, but you
couldn't do it over the air.
JUSTICE SCALIA: That's my understanding, too. I think
you got to get out of it some other way. I mean, you've got
to say it's content but it doesn't apply when it's the
government contributing money or it doesn't apply when
you're applying it to money that's being coerced by the
government.
221
ATTORNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
Likewise Justices will tell attorneys what point they have to
concede, though not always without resistance from the
attorney:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How is the government speaking?
You have already acknowledged that the wealthy
candidate can spend as much as he or she wants and the
end result of this scheme is that there will be more, not
less, speech because the non-affluent opponent will now
have more money to spend that he didn't have before. So I
think you have to concede that overall the scheme will
produce more political speech, not less.
ATTORNEY: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I can't concede that,
and this is the reason why.2 22
Neither do Justices quail from correcting attorneys:
ATTORNEY: Because there is no Federal labor policy that
requires States to use State treasury money to finance a
party who is engaged in this debate. That's why this is
just like Rust.

the State to direct to the union what speech it can or cannot spend its dues on.
Id.
221. Id. at 53. The respondent had just argued that he did not believe that
the state's laws were content-based restrictions, wherein Justice Ginsburg had
corrected him by stating that content refers to a category of speech, not
necessary a political position.

222. Davis, supra note 197, at 5-6. The petitioner had just agreed with
Justice Scalia that the government cannot engage in political speech, wherein
Chief Justice Roberts had challenged that notion and asked for case law
supporting it. Id. at 5.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: Just like-like Gould ....223

Nor do Justices shy away from merely lecturing the attorney
as if he or she was a student in a classroom, as did Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Scalia 224 in the examples below:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Blumstein, there's one feature
of this that I find puzzling. You're making this a First
Amendment case. But you joined an association that has
such, certain rules and when one joins, one agrees to abide
by the rules.
Nothing in the world stops Brentwood from saying this
anti-recruiting rule is a really bad rule, it is unfair to us;
you could have written op-ed pieces about it, the school
could have talked about it, the school could have urged the
board of education to drop it. Nothing stopped you from
attacking this rule that you don't like. But when you
signed on, the First Amendment doesn't give you license
not to follow the rules that you disagree with.225
ATTORNEY: Your Honor, the problem with the Solomon
Amendment is that the Government is demanding
absolute parity. We have a statute before us that
223. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Chamber of Com. v. Brown, 128 S.
Ct. 2408 (2008) (No. 06-939), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argumentjtranscripts/06-939.pdf.
California passed a law
preventing the use of state funds to either prevent or promote union organizing,
and several California companies challenged the law arguing that it infringed
upon their right to non-threatening anti-labor speech protected by federal law.
Id. at 3-4. Chief Justice Roberts had just put forth a hypothetical situation in
asking how the state can receive federal grant money based on federal
guidelines that certain policies needed to be implemented, and then have the
state turn around and say that it did not want to waste the money on
implementing those guidelines. Id. at 34-35.
224. Noting a possible connection between the classroom and the courtroom,
after admitting his, at times, overbearing nature during oral argument
questioning, Scalia declared: "It is the academic in me. I fight against it. The
devil makes me do it." O'BRIEN, supra note 54, at 248.
225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n v. Brentwood, 551 U.S. 291 (2007) (No. 06-427), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06427.pdf. Brentwood Academy, a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association, was sanctioned by the Association for violating
recruitment rules after a Brentwood coach contacted players at other schools;
Brentwood argued that the Association was infringing its First Amendment
rights to speech. Brentwood, 551 U.S. at 294-95. The respondent had just been
outlining the sanctions that had been placed against Brentwood for its
violations of the Association's rules. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
225, at 26.
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demands exactly the same services, without regard to
whether the military actually needs them. In order for
Congress to justify the parity requirement, which is the
only statute before this Court, Congress has to state a
need. It has to say why it needs whatJUSTICE SCALIA: Here's a need. How about this? We
have said in our opinions-and I am quoting from Rostker
versus Goldberg--"Judicial deference is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority
to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance
is challenged." And that's
226
precisely what we have here.
The Justices frequently exert control in the courtroom,
changing the topic when they feel so inclined:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well-well, there really-there are
findings against you, and to say that a lawyer is a crook, a
liar, and a thief and you're trying to tell us that that's not
defamatory, I mean, I-I think we should just proceed
on-on some other basis for this argument. We have other
questions to discuss.227
A very dramatic example of this came after the first
sentence 228 of address to the Court by an amicus attorney
with the Justice uninterested in the attorney's prepared
direction:
ATTORNEY: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it
please the Court:
The First Amendment does not prevent the government
from speaking out in order to revive and expand the
market for the nation's most important agricultural
product.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: If we can just continue on

226. Rumsfeld, supra note 218, at 43-44. Justice Breyer had just been
questioning the respondent as to why the remedy in this situation was not more
speech instead of restricting the military's speech. Id. at 43.
227. Tory, supra note 177, at 10. The petitioner had been going back and
forth with several Justices, claiming that defamation had not occurred. Id. at
9-10.
228. Chief Justice Roberts, writing of his time as an advocate before the
Court, noted:
When I was preparing for Supreme Court arguments, I always worked
very hard on the first sentence, trying to put in it my main point and
any key facts, because I appreciated that the first sentence might well
be the only complete one I got out in the course of the argument.
Roberts, supra note 48, at 71.
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government speech, because that's whereATTORNEY: Yes.
JUSTICE KENNEDY:-where we left off. It seems to me
there is something offensive about making a particular
portion of the public pay for something that the
government says.
ATTORNEY: Justice KennedyJUSTICE KENNEDY: It ought to be out of the general

fund. 229
Another clear instance of a Justice not seeming to care what
an attorney wants to say comes in this exchange between
Justice Breyer and an attorney:
JUSTICE BREYER: What does he do? I mean I looked at
what he does in 74, 75, 76a. He seems to spend a lot of
time moving furniture. He lists that twice. He runs the
office. And he represents, he is out in the local office
somewhere and he talks to constituents. I mean, he
doesn't even appear in the Senate office except very rarely
in which case he is doing casework. So I guess if he is
included in that, I mean so is a full-time furniture mover.
ATTORNEY: Justice Breyer, he did significantly more
than that. FirstJUSTICE BREYER: I have the whole list here. What here
suggests, he ever-he doesn't even write a statement for
the floor. There is nothing here that suggests one word of
anything he did ever went to a committee meeting, to a
floor of the Senate, anything.2 3 °
Apparently Justices, somewhat like football teams who are
ahead near the end of a game and to kill time keep running
the football, spend a fair amount of an attorney's allotted
229. Veneman, supra note 180, at 20-21. The second attorney for the
petitioners had just been granted permission to begin his argument. Id. at 20.
230. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S.
511
(2007)
(No.
06-618)
[hereinafter
Dayton],
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06618.pdf. U.S. Senator Mark Dayton fired his employee Hanson after Hanson
had taken leave from work for a heart problem, wherein Hanson sued Dayton,
arguing that he had been discriminated against because of a disability, and
Dayton responded that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution granted
him immunity from the lawsuit. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Dayton v. Hanson,
No. 06-618 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2007). The petitioner had just been arguing that the
Speech or Debate Clause protected Dayton because hiring and firing employees
that were involved with legislation fell within the Clause's sphere of protected
activity. Dayton, supra note 230, at 15.
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time in oral argument making points and giving their
opinions. Maybe the most typical example of such behavior is
the following in which Justice Scalia, 231 after an attorney has
asked to be allowed to reserve the rest of her time, jumps in
and makes a series of statements attacking her arguments,
asking only one question, a leading one, and thus reduces the
time she will have for rebuttal at the end of the case:
ATTORNEY: I would like to reserve the balance of my
time.
JUSTICE SCALIA: A physical, a physical office, yes. I
mean, they didn't work in the hallway. But their staff
salary was not paid out of their, quote, "office." It was
paid out of the Senate.
ATTORNEY: Well, actually the structure doesn't support
that. The Senate, within the Senate, each member does
pay the salary, sets the salary. We can have legislative
directors and do have legislative directors in two different
offices, different salaries, different numbers of paid days,
different number of annual leave days.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Setting it is quite different from
paying it.
ATTORNEY: It is paid forJUSTICE SCALIA : The Senator sets it and the Senate
pays it.
ATTORNEY: Justice Scalia, actually the Senate is given
an appropriation and all of his salaries must be paid from
the appropriation.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. The Senate puts a limit on how
much money it will spend for a particular Senator. That's
all that amounts to. It doesn't hand him the money. It's
still the Senate's money, isn't it? And what the Senate
says is each office will have so much of a call upon our
fund and no more.
ATTORNEY: Is the appropriated fund for the Senator and
the Senator is the one who pays the fund. If I may, I'd like

231. Justice Scalia's aggressive verbal attacks initially caught even some of
his own colleagues off guard, particularly given that they hailed from an era
when oral argument behavior was more staid. One of Scalia's biographers, John
Jeffries, records that the new Justice asked so many questions during his initial
period on the bench that Justice Powell leaned over to Justice Marshall during
one oral argument session and whispered, "Do you think he knows that the rest
of us are here?" Biskupic, supra note 61.
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to reserve the rest of my time.232

Giving credence to the argument that Justices use oral
argument to speak to each other since they do not have that
opportunity during voting on the merits of a case, some of the
most interesting and dramatic parts of oral argument occur
when Justices speak to each other. Sometimes this interJustice communication is indirect, occurring through the
attorney.
In the exchange below Justice Souter first
hammers home a point, then Justice Scalia attempts to rebuff
Justice Souter's point via questioning the attorney, and then
Justice Ginsburg pushes back against Justice Scalia through
her statement to the attorney:
JUSTICE SOUTER: It never be-if that's going to be the
standard, there will never be a facial challenge.
ATTORNEY: I'm not sure that that's terribly significant,
because if you have an as-applied challengeJUSTICE SOUTER: There never will be there one, will
there?
ATTORNEY: As to an as-applied challenge? I don't know
why not.
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, as to a pre-enforcement facial
challenge to a law like this.
ATTORNEY: I think it could be pre-enforcement and asapplied in a way that could have ultimatelyJUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but I want you to answer my
question.
ATTORNEY: I'm sorry. Yes, I think that's true.
JUSTICE SOUTER: We're not going to have facial
challenges here, are we?
ATTORNEY: Right.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Does that scare you, Mr. Fisher, that
there can't be a facial challenge?
ATTORNEY: No.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, every facial challenge is an

232. Dayton, supra note 230, at 30-31. Justice Souter had just referred to
the petitioner's argument that the personal office of a member of Congress had

always existed was a fiction, wherein the petitioner had responded that
members of Congress have always had a personal space-an office to do their
work. Id. at 29-30.
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immense dictum on the part of this Court, isn't it?
ATTORNEY: I think that's right.
JUSTICE SCALIA: This Court is sitting back and looking
at the ceiling and saying, oh, we can envision not the case
before us, but other cases. Maybe it's one half of one
percent or maybe it's [forty-five] percent, who knows. But
we can imagine cases in which this law could be
unconstitutional, and therefore, the whole law is
unconstitutional. That's not ordinarily the way courts
behave, is it?
ATTORNEY: I should hope not.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, we've done that in the First
Amendment area.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: That is not the case that you are
confronting.
ATTORNEY: That's right.2 33
Here again the Justices engage in a verbal tug-of-war with
the attorney caught in the middle:
JUSTICE SOUTER: So it didn't deter him. You're in the
position in which it clearly didn't deter your client. He
says, I'm going to spend three times as much as the
threshold figure, and there is no empirical evidence that
it's deterring anybody else.
ATTORNEY: Well, Justice Souter, in fact it did deter my
client. If you look at his election in its totality, his
opponent spent over [five] million.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Do we usually evaluate restrictions on
First Amendment rights on the basis of whether the chill
that was imposed by the government was actually
effective in stifling the right?
ATTORNEY: No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SCALIA: If the person goes ahead and speaks
anyway, is he estopped from saying that the government
was chilling his speech nonetheless?
ATTORNEY: Absolutely not, Justice Scalia.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Isn't that's what's going on here?
ATTORNEY: Absolutely.
233. Crawford, supra note 190, at 36-38. Justice Souter had just made the
point, agreed to by the respondent, that a voter ID law will always have
potential cases of infringement on rights, making it impossible for a facial
challenge to always be inappropriate. Id.
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JUSTICE SOUTER: Don't we expect a chill argument to
at least have a ring of plausibility?
And your chill
argument is that it is deterring. It didn't deter your client.
There is no indication that it would deter anybody else
and I have to say I don't see why it would.23 4
Occasionally, though, Justices will eschew subtlety and
directly answer another Justice's question or comment on
their remark, as in the following three examples:
JUSTICE SCALIA: That's a fairly bright line that you
don't have to worry about stepping over the wrong side of
it.
ATTORNEY: That's right.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Whereas this one, especially if you
adopt a context determination that requires a 1000-page
district court opinion, who knows.
JUSTICE BREYER: Is that right? I mean, 1000 is what
we have here, is we happen to have three criteria,
absolutely clear: Does it mix the candidate? Does it run
within [thirty] or [sixty] days before the election? And is it
targeted to an electorate? Now, that's clear.235
JUSTICE STEVENS: It had never anticipated a private
right of action, even though it read the Cannon opinion,
which was written some [twenty] years ago? Maybe more
than that. I don't remember.
ATTORNEY: Justice Cannon [sic], your opinion there is
going to be around for a long time. The scholars are going
to have to debate it for years.
JUSTICE SCALIA: There were some later cases that cast
a good deal of doubt on whether we would apply Cannon
anymore.
JUSTICE STEVENS: But Congress itself has adopted the
236
rule set forth in Cannon.

234. Davis, supra note 197, at 6-7.
The petitioner argued that the
millionaire's law would deter self-financed candidates from reaching the
$350,000 threshold that allows their challenger to raise more money from
individuals, but Justice Souter responded that the petitioner was not deterred
by the law in this case and actually planned to spend a million dollars, which
the petitioner said was correct. Id. at 4, 6-7.
235. FEC, supra note 185, at 40. Justice Scalia had just made the point,
which was agreed to by the respondent, that it is easy for donors to tell whether
or not they are giving money directly to a candidate. Id.
236. Jackson, supra note 187, at 38-39. The respondent had been arguing
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JUSTICE SCALIA: How-I mean, can we do that in a case
that comes up here, and just say, "There are good
arguments on both sides, it's quite plausible," and remand
the case without resolving the issue?
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE GINSBURG: They asked the District Court to
resolve it. They said the District Court should resolve it in
the first instance, and then they would review it,
presumably.
237
ATTORNEY: That's right, Justice Ginsburg.
In the exchange below the attorney is ignored altogether, and
the first Justice seems to be jarred a little by his colleague's
direct address:
JUSTICE BREYER: So thereforeJUSTICE SCALIA: Is this a civil rights statute that
provides for a private cause of action? I-I want to know
what the hypothetical is.
JUSTICE BREYER: I'd-I'd like to-I'm thinking of
various civil rights statutes which
make it unlawful to
238
describe--to-to discriminate.
But by far the most hostile interaction between Justices
during oral argument occurred between Justices Souter and
Scalia,23 9 with Chief Justice Roberts eventually having to step
in:
that the board of education had not anticipated that accepting federal funds
would make it vulnerable to retaliatory private action. Id.
237. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc., 547
U.S. 9 (2006) (No. 04-1244),
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral.arguments/argument-transcripts/041244.pdf. The National Organization for Women contended that acts of physical
violence by anti-abortion protestors equated to extortion under the Hobbs Act,
while Scheidler and other protestors argued that such violence was not relevant
to the Act because the violence was not used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler,
547 U.S. at 13. The petitioner had been arguing prior to this point in the
transcript that the lower circuit court had failed to reach a definite conclusion.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 237, at 14.
238. Jackson, supra note 187, at 33-34. Justice Breyer had just put forth a
hypothetical situation where a white person was beat up for associating with
blacks and asked the attorney if the white individual could sue under civil
rights statutes. Id. at 33.
239. Apparently these two Justices have seriously sparred before during oral
argument, with one attorney noting during a particularly prolonged exchange
between Souter and Scalia that "I almost sat down." Matt Stearns, High Court
Rivals Duel on Kansas Death Law, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 26, 2006, at Al.
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JUSTICE SOUTER: But YellowtailATTORNEY: -which involves veryJUSTICE SOUTER: -is-is an ad of-an obviously sham
ad. The problem that we're dealing withJUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bopp, did-did the opinion refer
toJUSTICE SOUTER: May-may I finish?
JUSTICE SCALIA: -sham ads?
JUSTICE SOUTER: Excuse me. May I-may I finish my
question?
JUSTICE SCALIA: Did the opinion refer to-CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Souter.
JUSTICE SOUTER: May I finish my question? Thethe-no one is saying that your ad in this case is an
obviously sham ad like Yellowtail.24 °
Taking into account the exchange above, Cooper sees oral
argument as a time when the Justices may "act out publicly
some of the usually unseen conflicts within the Court."2 41 He
divides such conflicts into two categories: (1) "matters of the
moment" or (2) "part of an ongoing pattern. '"42
In short, Justices appear to use oral argument very little
for information seeking. Often their questions are not very
inquisitive, and most of the time they are speaking in
statements rather than questions. True, some of those
statements request information or are interpreted by the
attorneys as questions, but those are not the norm. Instead,
Justices seek to make their viewpoints known, likely to signal
to other Justices how they are leaning in a case and also in a
possible attempt to influence their colleagues on the bench.

240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v.
FEC,
546
U.S.
410
(2006)
(No.
04-1581),
available
at

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/041581.pdf.

Wisconsin Right to Life preemptively sued the FEC due to their

intention to use funds to run televised political ads within sixty days of an
election, a violation of federal law. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 546 U.S. at 410-411.

Justice Souter was questioning the petitioner as to how this case was different
than a similar case the Court had ruled on. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 240, at 15-16.
241. COOPER, supra note 45, at 72.
242. Id.
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B. Analytical Findings
1. 1963-1965
The sentence type appearing most frequently in the
1960s cases was that of a declaration as Justices spent 44.1
percent of the time not asking any type of question at all (see
figure 3).
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Figure 3. Sentence-type distribution in percentages, 1963-1965.
In fact, by dividing the sentence types into two categoriesinformation seeking (1-3) and non-information seeking (4-5),
over half of the time (51.9 percent) Justices did not appear to
be seeking information during oral argument in the 1960s.
The average number of words uttered by a Justice per side in
a case in the 1960s cases was 200.
To determine what factors are causing information
seeking during oral argument, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression analysis 243 was performed first with informationseeking scores as the dependent variable (see table 2 in
Appendix I). Three models compete for the best fit of the data
(highest adjusted R 2): two, three and five. For information
243. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the basic form of regression
analysis wherein a linear relationship between the independent (causal) and
dependent (reactive) variables is assumed. OLS regression predicts a value for
each dependent variable data point based on the existing correlational
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Then, OLS
regression run a line through the data points, minimizing the difference
between the predicted and actual values of the dependent variable.
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seeking, three of the legal model predictors-attorney
experience, an attorney from the solicitor general's office, and
sides with an amicus party arguing during oral argumentreached statistical significance (p < 0.05) in every model.
Whether or not a side was the petitioner (or appellant) in a
case approached, but did not reach statistical significance.
The substantive contributions of these variables,
however, varied somewhat. For example, for every additional
case one side's attorney had argued before the Supreme
Court, the mean information-seeking scores for that side
decreased by between 0.09 and 0.11, depending on the model
examined. Thus, an attorney representing a side for whom
this appearance made his 2" tenth appearance before the
court could expect, on average, a decrease on the informationseeking scale of 0.9-1.1, meaning that Justices were more
likely to seek information from more experienced attorneys
after controlling for other potential causes of information
seeking. For sides that included an attorney from the U.S.
solicitor general's office, an increase in the informationseeking score occurred, ranging from 0.54-0.68.
Hence,
Justices in the 1960s cases tended to engage in less
information seeking with solicitor general attorneys than
other attorneys. Finally, when a side had an amicus party
arguing with it in oral argument, information-seeking scores
increased, on average, from 0.97-1.29, as Justices engaged in
less information seeking with sides aided by amicus parties.
This is interesting because it appears that during the 1960s,
Justices were not seeking additional specific information from
oral amici, which is in contrast to the findings of Collins.2 45
Regarding ideology, both the raw Martin-Quinn scores
and the absolute values of those scores reached statistical
significance (p < 0.01), whereas the dummy variable
indicating ideological direction based on the Martin-Quinn
scores was not statistically significant (1=conservative and
0=liberal). Thus, it is both the direction of a Justice' ideology
as well as how ideological he is that matters in predicting
information seeking. Substantively, for every Martin-Quinn
unit that a Justice moved to the right (toward a higher,

244. There were no female attorneys included in the sample of 1960s First
Amendment-related cases.
245. Collins, supra note 159.
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positive
value),
information
scores
decreased
by
approximately 0.19, evidencing that more conservative
Justices engaged in more information seeking. Looking at
the absolute value of ideology, as values increased, indicating
increasing
partisanship,
information-seeking
scores
decreased by 0.30. Thus more ideologically extreme Justices
engaged in more information-seeking behavior.
The
ideological match variable was not significant.
For the
attitudinal model, no Justice abstained from speaking in all
twelve cases, seemingly indicating that no one was purely
driven by ideology, though Justice Clark only spoke to seven
of the twenty-four (29.2 percent) parties he encountered.
An examination of Justice-specific control variables
shows that all three-perceived qualifications, years on the
Supreme Court, and law professor experience-were
statistically significant predictors in most or all of the models
(p < 0.05). The results are contradictory for interpreting the
substantive impact of the perceived qualifications, as in
models 2 and 3 the sign on the coefficient is negative,
meaning more qualified Justices engage in more information
seeking (i.e., have lower information-seeking scores), but the
sign on model 5 is positive, indicating just the opposite: more
qualified Justices engaged in less information seeking. More
specifically, for example, in model 5, an increase of 0.5 units
on the 0-1 perceived qualification scale results in an increase
information-seeking score of 0.99, meaning that Justices who
were perceived as more qualified in the Segal ratings 246 were
less likely to engage in information seeking. However, looking
at model 2, an increase of 0.5 on Segal's 0-1 perceived
qualification scale leads to a substantial decrease in
information-seeking scores of 1.81, with more "qualified"
Justices seeking more information during oral argument.
Fortunately the Supreme Court experience variable is
consistent. An examination of model 2 shows that for every
ten years on the bench, information-seeking scores decreased
by 0.4 as more experienced Justices engaged in more
information seeking. Finally, Justices who had experience
teaching law before coming to the Supreme Court experienced
a decrease in information-seeking scores, ranging from 0.45 to
246. Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees,
supra note 169.
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Thus, former law professors engaged in more
0.69.
information seeking, at least on the surface.
Next, ordinary least squares regression was performed
with the average word count per side per justice as the
dependent variable (see table 3 in Appendix I). Regression of
word counts on the same variables shows some changes in the
predictors that reach statistical significance. Two different
types of regression were performed. Arguably, models 3, 5,
and 6 had the best fit. For the legal model variables, attorney
experience, whether or not counsel was from the solicitor
general's office, and being the petitioner in a case did not
matter. Whether or not a side had an amicus party was
statistically significant in two of the models (p < 0.05), and
approached statistical significance in four more models (p <
0.10). In the two models where the amicus party variable did
achieve statistical significance, having an amicus party on
one's side during oral argument led to an average increase in
word counts per Justice of 249.4 to 284.5 words. Thus,
Justices want to talk more when an amicus party is involved.
This is understandable given the fact that the court has
invited an amicus party for a specific reason. However,
coupled with the findings regarding information-seeking
scores, in the 1960s, Justices seemed to be inviting amicus
parties to argue before the court in order for the Justices to
make more declarations to them, but not engage in higher
levels of information seeking.
Ideology was a statistically significant predictor of word
counts in all three forms: raw Martin-Quinn scores, absolute
value of Martin-Quinn scores, and dummy variable of MartinQuinn scores. With regard to the plain ideology variable (raw
Martin-Quinn scores), for every Martin-Quinn unit that a
Justice moved to the right (toward a higher, positive value),
word counts decreased from between 32.6 to 36.7 words
(depending on the specific model), evidencing that more
conservative Justices spoke less on the Warren Court in this
time period. For the absolute value of ideology, looking at the
model with the best fit of the two (model 8), an increase in
one unit led to a decrease in words of forty-seven, showing
that more ideologically extreme Justices spoke less. And in
examining the ideology dummy variable, conservative
Justices spoke, on average, 114.2 words more per side than
liberal Justices. Again, the ideology match variable was not
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significant; and no justice refrained completely from speaking
in all twelve cases, indicating a lack of support for the
attitudinal model.
Surveying the three Justice-specific variables in the three
best regression models indicates that years on the court and
perceived qualifications were always statistically significant
(p < 0.05), and law professor experience ranged from
insignificant to approaching significance to significant,
depending on the model. At times, both the years on the
court and perceived qualifications variables exhibited a
nonlinear relationship as quadratic or logged versions of the
variables achieved statistical significance when the linear
version did not. For the perceived qualifications variable,
using model 8 because of its straightforward interpretation,
an increase of 0.5 units on the Segal scale resulted in an
increased word count of 145.9. Therefore, Justices perceived
as more qualified spoke more during oral argument in the
1960s. Increasing the amount of time a Justice spent on court
also led to higher word count totals. Looking at model 5, on
average, a one year increase of Court experience decreases
word counts by nearly twenty-five words, though the
nonlinear nature of the variable makes this only a rough
approximation as the line will flatten out as experiences
increases.
Finally, in model 3, having law professor
experience actually decreased the average word count by
178.5 words (p < 0.05), but did not achieve statistical
significance in models 5 and 6.
Next, probit regression 47 was performed in order to see
whether the behavior of Justices during oral argument in the
1960s can predict their eventual vote on the merits (see table
4 in Appendix I). In none of the models did informationseeking scores or word counts achieve statistical significance.
What did matter was whether or not a Justice's ideology
matched the ideology of a side in a case, as well as whether or
not a side was the petitioner. Not surprisingly, sides that did
not match a Justices' ideology had a lower probability of
earning that Justice's vote. Being a petitioner in the 1960s,
247. Probit regression is a nonlinear regression model used when the
dependent variable is binary (can only take two values). Probit regression
results in predicted values ranging from "0" to "1," or, the probability of
something occurring. Probit regression uses standard normal cumulative
probability distribution functions to make calculations.
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however, meant an increased probability of getting Justices to
vote your way.
2. 2004-2009
Turning to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Justices in
the 2000s engaged in even less information seeking (see
figure 4) as just over two-thirds of the sentences of Justices
were declarations and only a quarter of sentences were some
type of legitimate information-seeking question (types 1-3).
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Figure 4. Sentence-type distribution in percentages, 2004-2008.
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A comparison of the two decades (see figure 5) shows a
significant shift toward less information seeking in the 2000s.
The percentage of open-ended questions (type 1) and bipolar
questions (type 3) decreased by 28.1 percent and 58.3 percent
respectively, whereas rhetorical questions (type 5) and
declarations (type 6) increased by 100 percent and 56.2
percent respectively.

4.8
3.9

1960s

2000s

Figure 6. Comparison of mean information-seeking scores, 1960s
v. 2000s.

When creating an average for each time period (see figure 6),
a clear pattern emerges with the 1960s Justices averaging a
3.9 (approximately a leading question for each sentence
uttered), and the 2000s Justices averaging a 4.8 (nearly one
rhetorical question for each utterance). A difference of means
test confirms that this gap is statistically significant (p <
0.0001).
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Figure 7. Comparison of mean word counts, 1960s v. 2000s.
Comparison of the average for each time period (see figure 7)
reveals the 1960s courts averaged using approximately 30.1
percent fewer words per Justice per side than the 2000s
courts. This difference is statistically significant (p < .0001).
This difference is not due to longer times for oral argument in
the 2000s. On the contrary, oral arguments times in the
1960s averaged 24.8 more minutes per case (see figure 8), a
difference that was statistically significant in a difference of
means test (p < 0.01).
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Figure 8. Average number of minutes for oral argument, 1960s v.
2000s.
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Therefore, with 41.6 percent more speaking time in the
1960s, Justices spoke 30.1 percent less than their
counterparts in the 2000s. Overall then, compared to their
1960s counterparts, Justices from the 2000s spoke more and
engaged less in information-seeking behavior. Unlike the
1960s Justices, a look at the difference between which side for
whom a Justice voted and both the information-seeking
scores and word counts reveals that Justices in the 2000s
treated the side they would eventually vote for differently
than the side they would vote against, as can be seen in
figures 9 and 10. Whereas Justices in the 1960s averaged
0.21 higher on the information-seeking scale for sides they
eventually opposed as compared to the sides they eventually
supported (a higher number meaning less information
seeking), Justices from the 2000s averaged 0.45 higher on the
information-seeking scale for sides they eventually voted
against-over double the difference of the 1960s court. And
while 1960s Justices actually spoke, on average, about six
words more to the side they would vote for, Justices in the
2000s averaged speaking eighty-nine words more to the side
they would vote against.
6
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Figure 9. Mean information-seeking scores per side in a case,
1960s and 2000s.
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Figure 10. Mean word counts per side in a case, 1960s and 2000s.
Noticeably absent from the list of Justices in the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is Justice Clarence Thomas.
In all twenty-three cases coded from the 2000s, the notedly
reserved Justice Thomas did not speak a single word. He also
appears to be the most partisan Justice currently on the
Court, with a Martin-Quinn score for that time period
ranging from 4.097 to 4.228, significantly higher than the
next most conservative Justice-Scalia at 2.769 in 2006-and
further from the center than the most liberal JusticeStevens at -2.57 in 2006. This would appear to indicate at
least one Justice that fits the attitudinal model in that he
does not demonstrate the need to gain additional information
during oral argument, nor does he seek to act strategically to
try and influence his fellow Justices in that venue. On the
other hand, Chief Justice Roberts has commented that
Justice Thomas's oral argument silence is due to his belief
that that forum is for the attorneys to speak their cause.248
248. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Question and Answer Session
Following an Address at Brigham Young University (Oct. 23, 2007). There are
numerous theories as to why Justice Thomas is so taciturn during oral
argument. As noted previously, Justice Thomas has stated that oral argument
is "not the real meat" of the role of the Supreme Court, Mauro, supra note 59, at
10, and has indicated that oral argument holds little value since, in his opinion,
ninety-nine percent of the time Justices have already made up their mind before
oral argument. Rombeck, supra note 60. Directly addressing his courtroom
silence Thomas simply stated: "IfI wanted to talk a lot, I would be on the other
side of the bench." David Lehrman, The New Order: As Alito Takes His Seat,
the Justices Get a Change of Scenery, LEG. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at 60.
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In order to control for legal, ideological and Justicespecific factors, ordinary least squares regression was
performed on the data from the 2000s cases. First, the
average information-seeking score was used as a dependent
variable (see table 5 in Appendix I). Models two and four
achieved the best fit with an adjusted R2 score at 0.18 or
slightly higher. Turning first to variables related to legal
factors, attorney experience and whether or not an attorney
was from the solicitor general's office did not achieve
statistical significance. Whether or not a side had an amicus
attorney did achieve statistical significance (p < 0.05) in four
of the models, and approached statistical significance in the
other two models (p < 0.10). Hence, having an amicus
attorney on a side resulted in a 0.22-0.26 drop in
information-seeking scores (meaning more information
seeking occurred), a finding that is hardly substantive though
statistically significant. Whether or not a side was the
petitioner was statistically significant in all six models (p <
0.01), though likewise not very substantive a finding, with
information-seeking scores reduced by between 0.24 and 0.26
for petitioners. Thus, Justices are engaging in higher levels
of information seeking with petitioners and those joined by
amicus parties, but not by much.
Ideology only reached statistical significance in one of the
three forms of ideology-absolute value of ideology (p < 0.01).
In model 4 an increase in one unit of ideology (or MartinQuinn unit) resulted in an increase in information-seeking
scores by 0.4. Therefore, more ideologically extreme Justices
engaged in less information seeking in the 2000s. The
direction of ideology-liberal or conservative-does not
appear to matter for the 2000s Justices.
Ideological
mismatch was not statistically significant. And, as noted
above, Justice Thomas's complete lack of participation in the
twenty-three cases studied indicates possible support for the
attitudinal model for at least one Justice.
Looking
at
Justice-specific
factors,
perceived
qualifications and years on the Court did achieve statistical
significance in the two best models of fit (models 2 and 4), and
law professor experience was statistically significant in all
but model 6. The nonlinear nature of the relationship makes
interpretation of the cubic perceived qualification variable
difficult. Suffice to say, the sign of the coefficient is negative,
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meaning an increase in perceived qualifications leads to more
information seeking (lower information-seeking scores). In
model 2, for every additional year on the bench, informationseeking scores increased by 0.15. Thus more experienced
Justices sought less information during oral argument.
Likewise in model 2, Justices with law professor experience
experienced a drop in information-seeking scores by 0.97,
meaning that Justices who spent time teaching law were
more likely to ask questions with more information-seeking
qualities.
3. Comparison
a. Information-Seeking Scores
Comparing the 1960s predictors of information seeking
during oral argument to 2000s predictors highlights some
interesting differences between the two decades (see table 6).
In the 1960s there was evidence supporting the legal,
strategic, and behavioralist models, and no evidence
supporting the attitudinal model. However, four decades
later the strength of the legal and strategic models decreased
while the behavioralist model's evidence stayed the same.
Furthermore, in the form of at least one Justice, evidence for
the attitudinal model was found.
Table 6. Comparison of predictors of information-seeking scores in
the 1960s v. 2000s.
1960s Info-Seeking Score
Predictors
Legal Model
Attorney Experience
Solicitor General Attorney
Amicus Party
Petitioner
Strategic Model
Ideology (Martin-Quinn
Scores)
Ideological Extremity (Ab.
Value)
Ideological Direction
Ideology Mismatch

2000s Info-Seeking Score
Predictors
Legal Model
Attorney Experience
Solicitor General Attorney
Amicus Party*
Petitioner
Strategic Model
Ideology (Martin-Quinn
Scores)
Ideological Extremity (Ab.
Value)*
Ideological Direction
Ideology Mismatch
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Table 6. (continued)
1960s Info-Seeking Score
2000s Info-Seeking Score
Predictors
Predictors
Attitudinal Model
Attitudinal Model
No oral argument behavior
No oral argument behavior
Behavioralist Model
Behavioralist Model
Perceived Qualifications*
Perceived Qualifications*
Years on the Supreme
Years on the Supreme
Court*
Court*
Law Professor Experience*
Law Professor Experience*
NOTE: bold=statistically significant; *not statistically significant in
every model.
Therefore, to specifically answer hypotheses put forth in
this study as they relate to information-seeking scores, Hla
(attorney experience) is confirmed with the 1960s data, but
not with the 2000s. Likewise, Hlb (solicitor general attorney)
is confirmed with the 1960s data, but not data from the
2000s. For Hlc (amicus party), both findings from the 1960s
and 2000s confirm the hypothesis. And looking at Hid
(petitioner), data from the 1960s does not support the
hypothesis while the 2000s data does.
Turning to the strategic model hypotheses, H2a (ideology
score) is confirmed with at least one of the three measures of
ideology in both decades. However, H2b (ideology match) is
not supported in either decade. For the attitudinal model
hypothesis, no support is found in the 1960s findings, but H3
(no verbal activity) is supported with the 2000s data. Finally,
the most successful model, in that all of its hypotheses were
supported in both datasets, was the behavioralist model.
Thus, H4a (perceived qualification), H4b (time on Court), and
H4c (professor experience) are all confirmed.
An examination of OLS regression on the 2000s word
counts of the Justices indicates some changes in significant
predictors from the predictors of information-seeking scores
(see table 7 in Appendix I). Models 3, 4, and 5 appear to have
the best fit. Not a single legal variable reached statistical
significance after controlling for ideological and Justicestatistical
specific factors.
Ideology scores achieved
significance in the quadratic form in model 3 and in the
absolute value form in model 4 and 5, and approached
statistical significance in the dummy variable form in models
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6 and 7. Using model 5 as appears to have the best fit
(adjusted R2 = 0.111, SER = 206.92),49 for every one-unit
increase of ideology, word counts increased by 59.3. Thus,
more ideologically extreme Justices, on average, spoke more
during oral argument in the 2000s. Again whether or not a
party's ideology matched a Justice's ideological leanings did
not matter.
Regarding the attitudinal model, Justice
Thomas's lack of participation could add support to such a
theory.
It was Justice-specific variables, however, that seemed to
perform the brunt of the explanatory work in the regression
models.
Perceived qualifications and law professor
experience were statistically significant in every model.
Using model 5, for every 0.5 unit increase in perceived
qualifications, average word counts per side increased by
nearly 202 words, a substantive increase showing that more
"qualified" Justices spoke more during oral argument in the
2000s. Also, Justices with law professor experience spoke, on
average, sixty-six words more per side in a case than their
counterparts who had not taught law. The variable for years
on the Supreme Court achieved statistical significance in the
three models with the best fit (models 3-5). Using model 5,
for every ten additional years on the court, word counts
increased by about twenty-four, a modest finding at best.
Thus, for the 2000s Justices, it is the more "qualified," more
experienced, ex-law professors who are more ideologically
extreme who, on average, speak more during oral argument.
b. Word Count Scores
A comparison of the predictors of word counts in the
1960s versus the 2000s likewise indicates shifts in which
models of judicial behavior and decision making carry the
most weight (see table 8).

249. R2 is the proportion of a dependent variable's variance that is explained
by its predictors (independent variables). Adjusted R2 is a modified version of
R' that takes into account the addition of predictors and prevents increased
numbers of independent variables from artificially inflating the score. Adjusted
2
R scores generally range from 0-1, with scores closer to 1 indicating a better fit
of the model to the data. The standard error of the regression (SER) estimates
the standard deviation of a model's regression error. It is also a measure of fit,
though its units are dependent upon the units of the dependent variable.
Roughly, the lower the SER, the better the fit of the model to the data.
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Table 8. Comparison of predictors of word counts in the 1960s v.
2000s.
2000s Word Count Predictors
1960s Word Count Predictors
Legal Model
Legal Model
Attorney Experience
Attorney Experience
Solicitor General Attorney
Solicitor General Attorney
Amicus Party
Amicus Party*
Petitioner
Petitioner
Strategic Model
Strategic Model
Ideology (Martin-Quinn
Ideology (Martin-Quinn
Scores)
Scores)*
Ideological Extremity (Ab. Ideological Extremity (Ab.
Value)
Value)
Ideological Direction
Ideological Direction
Ideology Mismatch
Ideology Mismatch
Attitudinal Model
Attitudinal Model
No oral argument behavior
No oral argument behavior
Behavioralist Model
Behavioralist Model
Perceived Qualifications
Perceived Qualifications*
Years on the Supreme
Years on the Supreme
Court*
Court*
Law Professor Experience
Law Professor Experience*

NOTE: bold=statistically significant; *not statistically significant in
every model.
The legal model, having only minimal support from the 1960s
data, has no support from the 2000s data. The strategic
model loses some support, but still retains a fair degree of
evidence for its validity. The attitudinal model is supported
by no evidence in the 1960s, but by some evidence in the
2000s. And the behavioralist model retained and even
slightly increased its strong support from the 1960s to the
2000s. Obviously there are some large differences between
the predictors of information-seeking scores and the
predictors of word counts. That indicates some divergence in
the concepts and also shows that one may be a better
operationalization of information seeking than the other.
Specifically looking at this study's hypotheses in light of
word counts as a measure of information seeking, Hla
(attorney experience), Hlb (solicitor general attorney), and
Hid (petitioner) are rejected. Hypothesis 1c (amicus party) is
supported by the 1960s findings, but not supported by the
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2000s data.
For the strategic model hypotheses, H2a
(ideology score) is supported by both decades, but H2b
(ideology mismatch) is not supported by the data from either
decade.
For the attitudinal model's hypothesis-H3 (no
verbal activity)-support emerges from the 2000s findings,
but not from the 1960s findings. And all three of the Justicespecific or behavioralist model hypotheses-H4a (perceived
qualifications), H4b (time on Court), and H4c (professor
experience)-are supported in both decades' data.
Turning to predictors of Justice voting in the 2000s,
unlike the data from the 1960s, information-seeking (or
sentence type) scores and word counts were statistically
significant predictors of how a Justice will vote, with word
counts continuing to be significant even after controlling for
other predictors (see table 9 in Appendix I). As noted in
models 2 and 3 of the probit regression of 2000s vote
outcomes, attorney experience (in the quadratic form),
whether or not an amicus attorney argues on a side, whether
or not a side is the petitioner, and whether or not the
ideological leanings of a side match a Justice are all
significant predictors of Justices' voting patterns in cases.
Whether or not an attorney from the solicitor general's office
argues on a side does not appear to matter. Thus both legal
and ideological factors appear to influence judicial decision
making.
As information-seeking scores increase (and therefore
information seeking decreases), the probability of a Justice
supporting that particular side decreases. Similarly, as word
counts increase the probability of a Justice voting for that
side decreases. Given the difficulty of interpreting probit
coefficients, figures 11 and 12 and table 10 show how
probabilities change for the change in values of both
variables. A party in a case has above a 0.50 probability of
prevailing as long as a Justice has an information-seeking
score of less than 4.5. But once a Justice reaches an average
information-seeking score of 4.5 or higher, the probability of
prevailing in a case drops below 0.50.
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6

Justice's Average Info-Seeking
Score for a Side
Figure 11. Probability of a 2000s Justice supporting a side as
information-seeking scores change.
0.7
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Justice's Word Count for a Side
Figure 12. Probability of a 2000s Justice supporting a side as word
counts change.
Much like voting and information-seeking scores, a linear
relationship appears to exist between the probability of a
Justice supporting a side in a case and the number of words
he or she speaks to that side. When very few words are
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spoken probability is high at above 0.60. However, when
Justices become extremely verbose probability drops below
0.20.
Table 10. Predicted probabilities of Justice support based on
information-seeking scores and word counts.
Information-seeking Score
1
2
3
4
5
6
Word Count
68 (1 standard deviation below mean)
287 (mean)
507 (1 standard deviation above mean)

Probability of Justice
Support
0.7817
0.7102
0.6294
0.5424
0.4533
0.3665
Probability of Justice
Support
0.5957
0.4694
0.3493

NOTES: Based on a baseline model of information-seeking score =
mean (4.80) and word count = mean (287.4), mean word count
probability does not equal 0.5 given the vote outcomes of the cases
selected.
Thus, the message of the findings is that if 2000s Justices
were asking questions of a party, but not too many, there was
a good chance the Justice would eventually vote for that side.
On the other hand, when a Justice made lots of statements to
a side, that side would likely not get the Justice's vote.
Table 11. Comparison of predictors of Justices' votes, 1960s v.
2000s.
1960s Voting Predictors
2000s Voting Predictors
Info-seeking Score
Info-seeking Score*
Word Count
Word Count
Attorney Experience
Attorney Experience*
Solicitor General Attorney
Solicitor General Attorney
Amicus Party
Amicus Party
Petitioner
Petitioner
Ideology Mismatch
Ideology Mismatch
NOTES: bold=statistically significant; *not statistically significant
in every model.
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A look at the differences between statistically significant
predictors of Justices' vote on the merits in the 1960s and the
2000s indicates an increase in variables that appear to
matter (see table 11).
In the 1960s, even after controlling for whether or not a
petitioner's ideology matched that of a Justice or not, being a
petitioner was a statistically significant predictor of an
individual Justice's votes, lending some support to the legal
model. Additionally, evidence for the attitudinal model could
be found in the fact that whether a party had the same
ideological orientation as a Justice was also a statistically
significant predictor of voting. Both of these predictors
remained important in the 2000s, but three predictors related
to the legal model-attorney experience, amicus party and
petitioner-became statistically significant.
More recent
Justices are telegraphing their future voting via word counts,
even after controlling for other predictors of voting. Hence,
H5a (information-seeking scores predict voting) and H5b
(word counts predict voting) are supported by the 2000s data,
but not by the 1960s findings.
Lastly, as previously noted, difference of means tests
confirmed that there was a statistical difference between both
information-seeking scores and word counts between the
1960s and 2000s, with the more recent Justices engaging in
less information seeking and speaking more during oral
argument. However, difference of means tests do not control
for other factors. Thus, to make certain that the differences
were real and not being caused by other variables, the data
from the two time periods was combined and regression was
performed with the addition of a dummy variable for the
1960s. As can be seen in table 12 in Appendix I, even after
controlling for other variables, the 1960s show a statistically
significant decrease in information-seeking scores ranging
from 0.75 to 0.84 in every attempted model. Thus, H6a
(information-seeking scores higher in 2000s) is confirmed.
Regression on combined word counts revealed the 1960s
dummy variable to be statistically significant in four of the
five models after controlling for other predictors, with
Justices in the 1960s averaging about seventy-five fewer
words spoken per side in a case (see table 13 in Appendix I).
Therefore, H6b (word counts higher for 2000s) is supported.
Because of the skewed distribution of cases, with nearly two-
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thirds coming from the 2000s, the combined data regressions
are not useful for examining other patterns among predictors
as the results would be disproportionately weighted to the
2000s data.
VI. CONCLUSION

The findings of this study are threefold. First, the
function of oral argument appears to have shifted from the
1960s to present. Whatever information-seeking value oral
argument had for the court in the 1960s, that value has
diminished as Justices use the oral argument time less for
asking questions and, more ostensibly, for speaking. Second,
while it is normal for scholars to stake out a school of thought
and strenuously defend it, the picture painted by these
findings on the predictors of judicial behavior during oral
argument is not nearly as black-and-white as favoring only
one judicial behavior and decision-making model to the
exclusion of the other two. It appears that legal factors
matter to the Justices, both in influencing their behavior and
their eventual vote on the merits.
Likewise, Justices'
ideological leanings appear to lead them to interact
differently with differing parties, pointing to the presence of
strategic behavior.
Furthermore, for apparently at least one Justice, and
maybe to a lesser extent for other Justices in particular cases,
the attitudinal model has merit in that information seeking is
not even attempted, presumably because ideology dictates a
Justice's decisions and further information is unnecessary.
Additionally, ideology plays a key role in predicting a
Justice's final vote. These findings coincide with arguments
made by other scholars. Cherry and Rogers contended:
[TIrying to determine whether the legal or attitudinal
model is most accurate may be asking the wrong question.
Relying on any single model may necessarily neglect
elements of truth in another model. A better approach
might be to look for a method of incorporating all existing
models
of
Supreme
Court
prediction
and
decisionmaking.25 °
Likewise, noted Court scholar Lee Epstein came to a similar
conclusion following the results of the Supreme Court
250. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 7, at 1157.
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Forecasting Project:
Political scientists concerned with explaining the range of
judicial decisions can no more afford to neglect the law
than law professors can ignore politics. At the least,
omission of either amounts to underspecification; at most
it serves to perpetuate myths about judging in both
disciplines: that it is a phenomenon largely about politics
or law. It is about both, and only by characterizing it as
such-perhaps through deeper collaborations between law
and political science-are we likely to develop truly
accurate accounts of how Justices operate. 5 1
In addition, this study indicates that the behavioralist model
deserves increased consideration and testing by scholars as
the model with the strongest support from this data.
Third, at least in the current Court, Justices do tip their
hands in oral argument as to which side they favor. While
there are exceptions, in general, the less information seeking
a Justice exhibits to a side, and the more a Justice speaks to
or with a side, the less likely that Justice is to support that
side in his or her eventual vote. This may allow for more
accurate predictions of case outcomes following oral
argument.
This study, of course, has limitations that can provide
some direction for future research in this area. The case
selection for this study was not random, limiting the
generalizability of these findings. It is possible that a random
selection of cases could have outcomes different enough to
change this study's conclusions.
Additionally, the cases
selected were all arguably high in ideological salience given
they focused on the core Constitutional principles of the
freedoms of speech and the press. Wrightsman found a noted
difference in the amount of questioning Justices engaged in
with the parties they would eventually oppose when
comparing cases where ideology was salient to cases where it
was not.25 2 Future research could easily remedy this. What
future research will have a harder time remedying is the fact
that even a large, random sample of cases is limited to the
two time periods in which transcripts note which Justice is
speaking.
Thus, findings are potentially influenced by
idiosyncrasies of the 1963-1965 Warren and 2004-present
251. Epstein, supra note 9, at 757-58.
252. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 103.
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Rehnquist/Roberts' Courts.
Another limitation of this study was that gender was not
taken into account. It is possible that the gender of the
attorneys and the Justices interact in significant ways,
resulting in omitted variable bias in the present study. The
texts which were coded are only as accurate as the
transcriber, and potentially leaving off question marks or
placing periods where a comma or semicolon should have
been could somewhat affect the data. Finally, studying the
complexities of face-to-face communication, where much
meaning is communicated via nonverbal behaviors such as
facial expressions and tone, with mere transcripts is
in
in measuring meaning, particularly
problematic
identifying questions that do not appear to be questions on
paper, and vice versa. Sacrificing some accuracy was deemed
a necessary evil, however, in order to ensure some reliability
to the study. If a reliable method of measuring information
seeking, taking into account spoken communication, could be
devised, such a methodology would likely be a more accurate
In conclusion, oral
measure than the one used here.
argument provides a window into how current Justices are
thinking on a particular case and appears to function as a
venue for Justice to signal to each other their possible voting
intentions as well as attempt to influence their companions
on the Bench in their eventual vote.
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APPENDIX I: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 2. OLS regression of 1960s information-seeking score on
predictors.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

Attorney

-0.11t

-0.10f -0.10:

-0.095

-0.10t

-0.10

-0.10

Experience
Sol. General
Attorney
Amicus Party

Ideology
Mismatch

(0.03)
0.62t
(0.19)
1.29
(0.45)
0.28*
(0.15)
0.07
(0.14)

(0.03)
0.68:
(0.18)
1.06t
(0.42)
0.24*
(0.14)
0.04
(0.13)

(0.03)
0.68
(0.19)
1.07t
(0.43)
0.25*
(0.15)
0.05
(0.13)

(0.03)
0.62
(0.18)
0.97t
(0.45)
0.23
(0.15)
0.06
(0.08)

(0.03)
0.54
(0.17)
1.09t
(0.39)
0.28*
(0.14)
0.06
(0.13)

(0.03)
0.62
(0.20)
1.22f
(0.45)
0.28*
(0.16)
0.08
(0.15)

(0.03)
0.68t
(0.20)
1.02t
(0.43)
0.25
(0.16)
0.05
(0.14)

Ideology

-0.21t

-0.21

-0.19t

.

.

.

.

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.05)

Petitioner

Abs. Value of

-

-

-

-

-

-

Ideology
Logged Abs.

-0.30t
(0.08)
-

-

Dummy
0.23
Perceived
Qualification (0.29)
Perceived

Qual.2
Years on Sup.
Court
Years on Sup
Court 2
Logged Years

-

-

-0.34t

-

-

(0.09)

Value
Ideology
Ideology

-

-

-

-3.62
(1.20)

-2.83t
(1.20)

-

3.18

2.78

-0.03
(0.01)

(0.96)
-0.04
(0.01)

(0.98)
-

-

-

-

-

0.88
(0.29)

-

1.98
(0.39)

-0.14
(0.17)
0.42
(0.28)

-

-

0.02*
(0.01)

-0.06
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.01)

0.003t
(0.001)

0.003t
(0.001)

-

-

-0.07

(0.15)
-. 298t
(1.25)
2.90t

(1.03)
-

-0.16t
(0.07)
(0.08)
0.04
0.03
0.31
-0.17
-0.54t -0.45t -0.69
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.31) (0.24) (0.16) (0.17)
3.75t 4.63
4.88
3.35t 2.31
4.06
4.99
(0.33) (0.42) (0.41) (0.32) (0.42) (0.33) (0.42)
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
N
5.26
6.28
4.41
6.60
6.09
5.56
6.32
F-statistic
0.166 0.215 0.218 0.179 0.217 0.106 0.156
Adjusted R 2
0.872 0.847
0.815
0.835 0.815
0.842 0.816
SER
NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
on Court
Professor
Experience
Constant

-

-

-0.30
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Table 3. OLS regression of 1960s word counts on
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DV=
DV=
DV=
DV=
Word
Word
Word
Word
Count
Count
Count
Count
-5.55
-4.98
-2.93
-5.81
Attorney
(5.50)
(4.57)
(5.02)
(4.61)
Experience
-24.55
-18.02
-7.96
-23.24
Sol. General
(40.78)
(36.76)
(35.22)
(38.53)
Attorney
Amicus Party 287.28* 284.53t 240.86* 224.06*
(148.14) (140.54) (133.38) (135.02)
-6.30
-9.54
1.27
.22
Petitioner
(26.62)
(27.08)
(28.37)
(27.56)
9.85
8.35
13.13
Ideology
12.41
(25.88)
(24.88)
(25.70)
Mismatch
(26.76)
-34.89t
-36.72t
Ideology
-32.60t
(12.16)
(12.76)
(11.97)
Abs. Value of
Ideology
Ideology
Dummy
Perceived
35.03
6 9.65
(51
1.37)
Qualification (54.78)
Perceived
2
Qual.
Years on Sup. -7.07T
(2.62)
Court
Years on2 Sup.
Court
-78.54T
Logged Years
(21.83)
on Court
-125.09 -195.57t
Professional
(76.00)
Experience
(79.77)
323.28t
259.23T
Constant
(72.08)
(64.40)
165
165
N
2.70t
F-statistic
2.02t
0.127
0.077
Adjusted R2
190.21
SER
195.55

-60.80±
(17.48)

-649.57t
(243.51)
608.27t
(196.56)

158.45t
(59.30)

979

(2.61)

-83.29T
(21.32)
-178.49t
(76.25)
484.141
(96.41)
165
3.80t
0.164
186.15

101.68
(74.72)
122.90t
(60.93)
165
4.37t
0.097
193.47

predictors.
Model 5 Model 6
DV=
DV=
Word
Word
Count
Count
-4.42
-3.21
(5.13)
(4.51)
-26.55
-4.60
(36.08)
(38.13)
249.42t 222.72*
(126.29) (129.15)
-2.24
-2.30
(25.92)
(27.88)
12.86
12.96
(26.46)
(25.00)

-47.04t
(18.66)

-114.17t
(27.94)
291.84f -588.74t
(62.47) (236.72)
562.13t
(192.47)
-24.91t
(9.96)
0.95t
(0.31)

-50.53
(93.20)
141.51t
(61.42)
165
4.86t
0.155
187.09

-59.32t
(19.88)
-86.44*
(44.26)
455.76t
(95.17)
165
4.22t
0.184
183.86

NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
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Table 4. Probit regression of Justice vote on potential predictors.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Information-Seeking Score
-0.11
-0.18
(0.11)

(0.13)

Logged Info-Seeking Score
Word Count

0.0001
(0.0005)

Ideology Mismatch
Attorney Experience
Solicitor General Attorney
Petitioner
Amicus Party
Constant
Observations
Wald X 2
Pseudo R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

0.41
(0.43)
165
0.87
0.0039
-113.90

0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.76T
(0.23)
0.04

-0.61
(0.40)
0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.77t
(0.23)
0.04

(0.06)

(0.06)

0.32
(0.46)
0.98t
(0.24)
-0.06
(0.72)
0.41

0.33
(0.46)
0.99t
(0.24)
-0.10
(0.72)
0.50
(0.57)
165
45.59t
0.2112
-90.19

(0.55)
165
45.23T
0.2086
-90.49

NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.

Table 5. OLS regression of 2000s information-seeking scores on
predictors.
Model 1
Attorney
Experience
Attorney
2
Experience
Attorney
3
Experience

0.003
(0.003)
-

Sol. General
Attorney
Amicus Party

0.07
(0.16)
-0.26t
(0.11)
-0.26*
(0.10)
0.04
(0.08)

Petitioner
Ideology
Mismatch

-

Model2
-0.033*
(0.018)

Model 3
0.003
(0.003)

0.0015*
(0.0008)
-0.00002*
(8.90e-06)

-

0.11
(0.16)
-0.22*
(0.12)
-0.24t

0.08
(0.16)
-0.26t
(0.11)
0.26t

(0.09)

(0.10)

-

0.06

0.04

(0.08)

(0.08)

Model 5 Model 6
0.004
-0.034*
(0.003) (0.019)
0.002*
(0.0008)
(0.001)
-0.000015
-0.00002
8.92e-06
(9.05e06)
0.12
0.07
0.09
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.17)
-0.23t
-0.26t
-0.21*
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.12)
-0.24t
-0.26t
-0.25t
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.10)
0.06
0.04
0.05
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Model4
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.0015*
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Table 5. (continued)
Ideology

Model 1

Model2

Model 3

0.02

-0.60*

-.

.

(0.03)

(0.31)
-.

.

-.

.

Ideology 2

-

0.08

Model4

Model 5 Model 6

(0.06)
Ideology3

0.11*

-

(0.06)
-

Abs. Value of

-

Ideology
Ideology

-

Dummy
Perceived
Qualification

-0.17
(0.32)
-

Perceived

(0.10)

-656.68t
(147.75)

-0.40
(0.26)

-

-0.19*

-0.15

-448.03:
(111.29)

(0.11)
0.01
(0.32)

(0.11)
-145.96*
(75.05)

-

578.91

Years on the

-

(83.33)
0.15t
(0.07)

-242.77t

0.01
(0.01)

(60.75)
0.24t
(0.05)

0.30t
(0.08)
4.82
(0.22)
320
4.09
0.088
0.733

(0.002)
-0.89t
(0.25)
115.18
(27.41)
320
3.93t
0.180
0.695

.-

Sup. Court 2
Professor
Experience
Constant

0.007t

0.31t
(0.09)
4.78
(0.26)
320
3.75t
0.080
0.736

N
F-statistic
Adjusted R 2
SER

-0.97t
(0.24)
166.15
(36.21)
320
4.44t
0.184
0.693

-

185.24*

(144.37)

-363.75t

0.01
(0.01)

-

-

-

(194.96)

Perceived

Qualification 3
Years on the
Sup. Court

0.40t

(0.06)
-

858.47t

Qualification 2

0.11*

(97.08)
-

-76.15*

0.005
(0.007)
-

(40.69)
0.11*
(0.04)
-0.003t

0.31
(0.09)
4.75
(0.24)
320
3.68
0.089
0.732

(0.001)
-0.28
(0.20)
41.43t
(18.62)
320
3.06
0.124
0.718

NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
Table 7. OLS regression of 2000s Justice word counts on predictors.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Attorney
-0.07
-4.17
-3.91
-0.14
-3.82
-0.05
-3.92
Exper.
(1.05)
(2.64) (2.59)
(1.04)
(2.59)
(1.02)
(2.58)
Attorney

Exper.2
Sol. Gen.
Attorney
Amicus
Party

-

0.07*

0.07

-20.64
(43.33)
-11.32
(33.50)

(0.04)
7.62
(44.40)
-23.05
(33.36)

(0.04)
10.11
(43.84)
-24.95
(33.23)

-

-13.77
(42.73)
-16.79
(32.81)

0.07

(0.04)
9.35
(43.66)
-24.22
(33.07)

-

-18.43
(42.56)
-15.37
(32.28)

0.07

(0.04)
5.97
(43.91)
-23.20
(32.69)
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Table 7. (continued)
Petitioner
-16.55 -16.42
(28.87) (28.68)
Ideology
4.62
5.72
Mismatch (23.22) (23.14)
Ideology
Ideology 2

-15.75
(28.48)
4.43
(22.76)

6.26

6.03

-1.12

(8.81)

(8.77)

(8.08)

-

-

19.23t

-15.28
(28.49)
4.16
(22.76)
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-16.15
(28.41)
4.28
(22.72)

-16.14
(28.58)
5.31
(23.10)

-

.

.

-

.

.

-17.03
(28.53)
5.41
(23.06)

(3.92)
Abs. Val. of

-

-

-

Ideology
Ideology

-

-

59.28t

(11.66)
.

-

Dummy
Perceived. -372.53* -374.73* -427.53*
Qual.
(103.90) (103.55) (105.89)
Years on
-0.75
-0.61
-3.26t
Court
(1.48)
(1.48)
(1.38)
Professor
59.80t 59.27t 62.80t
Exp.
(25.50) (25.40) (25.10)
Constant
614.89* 628.58* 654.81t
(93.16) (92.91) (94.01)
F-test of

60.16t

(11.52)

-

-

-404.34*
(92.25)
-2.53t
(1.10)
66.00*
(23.54)
570.45*
(23.54)

-

-

51.38* -50.07*

-403.73t
(91.74)
-2.37t
(1.11)
66.12t
(23.50)
582.09*
(86.75)

(28.72)
-261.09t
(104.98)
-2.38*
(1.30)
67.50t
(24.09)
563.46*
(88.75)

(28.61)
-263.49t
(104.58)
-2.20*
(1.30)
67.56t
(24.03)
576.14*
(88.63)

1.17

-

1.31

-

Att Exp,
Att Exp2
N
320
320
320
320
320
320
320
F-statistic
4.54t
4.56*
6.18*
7.42*
7.02*
4.63*
4.49*
Adjusted R2 0.071
0.075
0.105
0.108
0.111
0.080
0.083
SER
211.67 211.00 207.55 207.26 206.92 210.48 210.08
NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
Table 9. Probit regression of 2000s Justices votes on predictors.

Attorney Experience

Model 1
-0.22t
(0.10)
-0.0014*
(0.0004)
-

Attorney Experience 2

-

Solicitor General's
Office Attorney

-

0.44
(0.33)

(0.0003)
0.24
(0.35)

Amicus Party

-

0.48t
(0.24)

0.56t
(0.24)

Information-Seeking
Score
Word Count

Model 2
-0.07
(0.11)
-0.002*
(0.0004)
-0.013
(0.008)
-

Model 3
-0.06
(0.12)
-0.0017t
(0.0005)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.0006t
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Table 9. (continued)
Model 1

Model 2
Model 3
1.20t
1.22t
(0.18)
(0.18)
Ideology Mismatch
-0.83*
-0.85t
(0.16)
(0.16)
Constant
1.41t
0.47
0.27
(0.46)
(0.56)
(0.58)
N
320
320
320
Wald X2
24.85t
107.76t
108.38t
Pseudo R2
0.0614
0.2921
0.3001
Log pseudolikelihood
-207.81
-156.74
-154.96
NOTE: *p < 0.10; tP < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
Petitioner

-

Table 12. Combined OLS regression of information-seeking score
with 1960s dummy variable.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
-0.001
-0.02*
-0.04t
(0.003) (0.01)
(0.02)
Att. Exp.2
0.00028* 0.002t
(0.00015) (0.001)
Att. Exp.3
-0.00002*
(8.56e-06)
Sol. Gen.
0.23*
0.30t
0.27t
Atty.
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.13)
Amicus
-0.26t
-0.28t
-0.20*
Party
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.12)
Petitioner -0.19t
-0.18t
-0.17t
Att. Exp.

Ideology
Match
Ideology
Ideology2

Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
-0.001 -0.02* -0.001 -0.014
-0.04t
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.009)
(0.02)
0.0003t
0.00026* 0.002t
(0.0001)
(0.00014) (0.001)
.0.00002*
(8.65e-06)
0.22*
0.29t
0.23*
0.29t
0.26t
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
(0.13)
(0.13)
-0.26t -0.27t -0.26t
-0.28t
-0.20*
(0.11) (0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.12)
-0.19t -0.18t -0.18t
-0.18t
-0.17t

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

-0.0003
(0.07)
-0.06*
(0.02)

-0.004
(0.07)
-0.06t
(0.02)
-

-0.001
(0.07)
-0.06t
(0.02)

-0.002
(0.08)

-0.01
(0.07)

0.0002
(0.07)

-0.003
(0.07)

-0.01
(0.07)

-

-

-

-

-0.02t

-

-

-

-

-0.09t
(0.04)

-

-

-

(0.01)
Abs. Value
Ideology
Ideology
Dummy
Perceived
Qual.
Years on
Court
Professor
Exp.
1960s

-

-0.08*
(0.04)

-

0.45t
(0.20)
0.0004
(0.01)
0.32t
(0.08)
-0.75t
(0.10)

0.46t
(0.20)
0.001
(0.006)
0.32t
(0.08)
-0.77t
(0.10)

0.45t
(0.20)
0.001
(0.006)
0.32t
(0.08)
-0.76t
(0.10)

-0.20t
.(0.08)
0.40t
0.41t
0.39t
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
0.004
0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.31t
0.31t
0.26t
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.75t -0.77t -0.82t
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)

-0.20t
(0.08)
0.39f
(0.19)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.26t
(0.08)
-0.84t
(0.10)

-

-0.20t
(0.08)
0.38*
(0.19)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.25
(0.08)
-0.83t
(0.10)
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Table 12. (continued)
Model 1
4.38t
(0.20)
485
N
F-statistic 15.25t
Adjusted
0.253
2
Constant

R

SER

0.800

Model 2
4.42t
(0.20)
485
14.36t
0.256
0.799

Model 3 Model 4
4.44t
4.46t
(0.21)
(0.20)
485
485
13.53t
16.77t
0.257
0.245
0.798

0.805

Model 5
4.49t
(0.20)
485
15.60t
0.248
0.803

Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
4.60t
4.64t
4.56T
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.20)
485
485
485
14.05t
16.11t 15.03t
0.249
0.251
0.252
0.803

0.802

0.801

NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
Table 13. Combined OLS regression of word counts with 1960s
dummy variable.
Model 5
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mo odel 1
-0.27
-0.24
-0.34
-0.33
0.21
Attorney Experience
(0.91)
(0.89)
(0.92)
).91)
(0.89)
-8.30
-4.76
1.50
9.91
1.19
Solicitor General
(31.10)
(32.14)
(31.09)
(30.90)
Attorney
(3 1.88)
4[.83
3.84
5.26
0.10
-0.11
Amicus Party
(30.49)
(30.33)
(29.87)
(29.93)
(3 0.83)
-27.47
-25.51
-28.13
-27.96
Petitioner
27.05
(21.25)
(21.52)
(21.09)
(2 1.66)
(21.22)
1.87
0.51
2.34
).94
2.31
Ideology Match
(1 9.31)
(19.06)
(18.85)
(19.10)
(18.87)
-51.66t
9.91
-50.80*
Ideology
(8.68)
3.43)
(9.60)
16.80t
16.57*
2.18
Ideology 2
(3.20)
?.08)
(3.24)
5.11*
-5.04t
Ideology'
(0.72)
(0.82)
Absolute Value of
Ideology
Absolute Value of
Ideology2
Ideology Dummy

Perceived

1562.33t
173.76
(773.46) (790.79)
Perceived
-3103.78* -413.63
2
(1446.21) (1493.10)
Qualifications
214.19
1711.31t
Perceived
3
(787.79) (817.35)
Qualifications
9.95t
4.45
Years on the Sup.
(4.92)
(5.04)
Court
-0.32t
-0.41t
Years on2 the Sup.
(0.14)
(0.15)
Court
30.10
10.91
Professor Experience
(31.72)
(33.12)
Qualifications

--

-60.21
(46.16)
4.23
(4.63)
-0.32t
(0.14)
32.22
(30.77)

103.05±
(20.22)
-21.02t
(4.34)

1722.27t
(696.96)
-3212.96t
(1328.32)
1681.16t
(733.63)
9.86t
(4.94)
-0.37t
(0.15)
29.88
(32.86)

-94.91T
(20.00)
-42.84
(44.85)

-4.90T

(1.02)
52.50t
(20.99)
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Table 13. (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1960s
-98.36t
-75.40t
-76.23t
-41.71
-117.46T
(31.61)
(32.00)
(29.96)
(34.71)
(25.66)
Constant
121.20
285.20t 320.56T
-37.18
443.78*
(125.13) (123.91)
(52.04) (113.18)
(51.59)
N
485
485
485
485
485
F-statistic
6.29*
8.93t
10.30t
9.05t
6.47t
Adjusted R2
0.086
0.131
0.135
0.111
0.099
SER
208.31
203.07
202.65
205.46
206.84
NOTE: *p < 0.10; tp < 0.05; tp < 0.01; robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the coefficients.
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APPENDIX II: CASES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Oral Argument
Term
Case
2007 Davis v. Federal Election
Commission
2007 Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board
2007 United States v. Williams
2007 Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican
Party
2007 New York State Board of Elections,
ET AL. v. Margarita Lopez
Torres, ET AL.
2006 Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association v. Brentwood
Academy
2006 Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v.
Hanson
2006 Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
2006 Chamber of Commerce of United
States v. Brown
2006 Morse v. Frederick
2006 Davenport v. Washington Education
Association
2006 Carey v. Musladin
2005 Garcetti v. Ceballos (Reargued)
2005 Beard v. Banks
2005 Randall v. Sorrell
2005 Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
Federal Election Commission
2005 Scheidler v. National Organization
for Women, Inc.
2005 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc.
2004 Tory v. Cochran
2004 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd.
2004 Clingman v. Beaver
2004 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education
2004 Veneman v. Livestock Marketing
Association

Date

Number
07-320

April 22, 2008

07-21

January 9, 2008

06-694
06-713

October 30, 2007
October 1, 2007

06-766

October 3, 2007

06-427

April 18, 2007

06-618

April 24, 2007

06-969

April 25, 2007

06-939

March 19, 2007

06-278
05-1589

March 19, 2007
January 10, 2007

05-785
04-473
04-1739
04-1528
04-1581

October 11, 2006
March 21, 2006
March 27, 2006
February 28, 2006
January 17, 2006

04-1244 November 30, 2005
04-1152

December 6, 2005

03-1488
04-480

March 22, 2005
March 29, 2005

04-37
02-1672

January 19, 2005
November 30, 2004

03-1164

December 8, 2004

2010]
1965
1965
1965
1965

1965
1965
1964
1964
1964
1963
1963
1963
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Time, Inc. v. Hill
Mishkin v. New York
Ginzburg, ET AL. v. United States
A Book, G. P. Putnam's Sons
(Intervenor) v. Attorney General
of Massachusetts
Linn v. United States
Rosenblatt v. Baer
Estes v. Texas
Federal Trade Commission v.
Colgate-Palmolive
Freedman v. Maryland
Jacobellis v. Ohio
A Quantity of Books, ET AL. v.
Kansas
New York Times v. Sullivan

April 27, 1966
December 7, 1965
December 7, 1965
December 7, 1965

November 18, 1965
October 20, 1965
April 1, 1965
December 10, 1964
November 19, 1964
April 1, 1964
April 1, 1964
39

January 6, 1964

